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INTRODUCTION
Fisher v. University of Texas' presents an Equal Protection challenge to
the University of Texas' race-preference admissions policy. In this article,
I am proceeding on the assumption that, in its decision, the Court will not
abolish affirmative action programs wholesale, if it addresses the merits of
Abigail Fisher's challenge. Considering the present makeup of the Court
following Fisher, colleges, universities, and graduate schools will remain
* Professor of Law, Pace Law School. For helpful comments and conversations, I
thank Bridget Crawford, Darren Rosenblum, and Emily Waldman. For indispensable
research assistance, I thank Megan Quinn, Naeema Livingston, Paul Rutigliano, and
most notably Marissa Kingman and Cynthia Pittson.
1. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
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free to pursue the Court's previously announced goal of admitting
individual students who, as a group, present a critical mass of diverse
viewpoints.2 To meet this goal, those institutions that take race into
account in the admissions process must create programs that are narrowly
tailored to achieve the compelling governmental interest in what has come
to be considered viewpoint diversity, an assurance of otherwise
underrepresented voices in the classroom.'
In many instances, accepting students who will bring a differing
viewpoint to the classroom is contrary to the current trend among colleges
and universities to pursue favorable national recognition from various news
outlets, most notably US. News & World Report.' The problem lies with
consideration of underrepresented students, who generally apply to colleges
and universities with academic test scores that are not competitive with
their majority peers.' The disparity between minority and majority
applicant test scores means that admitting a significant number of minority
students would result in a potential decrease in a school's mean
standardized test scores for entering students, numbers that factor
significantly into a school's national rank. For the most part, institutions of
higher education have become so consumed with the goal of achieving the
highest possible ranking that they are uninterested in constructing
constitutionally permissible race-preference admissions programs, even in
light of the Court's continued guidance on the matter.
Although the Court has considered the constitutionality of race-
preference admission policies on only two occasions,6 the law concerning
the matter is fairly clear. Justice Powell, in the 1978 case of University of
California v. Bakke,' charted a new course for programs that were
originally designed to remedy the present effects of past discrimination,
presenting them instead as programs that benefit everyone in the classroom,
by ensuring a diversity of viewpoints.' And as recently as 2003, the Court
reaffirmed its conclusion that there is a compelling governmental interest in
ensuring viewpoint diversity in the classroom. 9 Institutions, therefore, can
construct policies that are narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
In the one instance in which the Court upheld race-preference programs,
2. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315-17 (2003).
3. See id.
4. See infra notes 344-346 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 347 350 and accompanying text.
6. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter, 539 U.S.
306, and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (decided the same day as Grutter).
7. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
8. Id. at 312-14 (citations omitted) (A college or university may consider race as
one of a host of other factors in achieving a learning environment open to
"'speculation, experiment, and creation."').
9. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (2003) ("Today, we hold that the [University of
Michigan] Law School has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.").
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Grutter v. Bollinger,0 the Court held that a policy that provided for
individual review of applicants' diverse qualities, including race, as a
means to ensure diverse voices, was sufficiently flexible and narrow
enough to withstand judicial scrutiny."
Following Grutter, the University of Texas (UT) adopted an admissions
policy that considered a host of soft factors, including race, for those Texas
residents who were not otherwise admitted by virtue of graduating in the
top 10% of their Texas high school class. 12 Abigail Fisher, the plaintiff in
the case, was rejected under both points and consequently sued the
school. Her case has made its way to the Supreme Court for
consideration."4
Based on the existing precedent, the Court can decide the Fisher case in
any of three ways. First, the Court could avail itself of the opportunity
presented by Fisher to expand the constitutional permissiveness of
considering race as a factor in admissions decisions." Given that four of
the eight justices deciding this case" have made clear their strong
opposition to the use of race in this context, this scenario is highly
unlikely." At the other end of the spectrum, the Court could find that there
is no longer a compelling governmental interest in the use of race in the
admissions process, thereby causing the sun to set on affirmative action
admissions policies much sooner than Justice O'Connor predicted in her
majority opinion in Grutter." This is an equally unlikely scenario because
four of the Justices have already confirmed their commitment to the
compelling governmental interest in using race-preference policies to
achieve viewpoint diversity.19 The most likely outcome is that the Court
10. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
11. Id. at 337 39 (citations omitted).
12. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 224, 227 28 (5th Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
13. Id. at 217.
14. Fisher v. Univ. ofTex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (granting certiorari).
15. See infra Part 111.B (discussing socioeconomic status as an alternative
approach to traditional affirmative action admissions standards).
16. Justice Kagan has recused herself from the decision because she was Solicitor
General when the Obama administration filed a brief with the lower courts siding with
the University of Texas. Jess Bravin, Justices to Revisit Race Issue, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
22, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB1 0001424052970203358704577237112218477648.html.
17. See infra Part 11.D (evaluating the probable outcome of Fisher, based on
Supreme Court Justices' decisions in similar cases on race-preference admissions
policies).
18. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("We expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest [in
student body diversity] approved today.").
19. See infra Part II.D (discussing why, in deciding Fisher, Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Kennedy, and Sotomayor are likely to uphold the Court's compelling
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will rule very narrowly, striking down the UT program as not being
narrowly tailored, while leaving intact the Court's previously articulated
finding of a compelling governmental interest in diversity education.2"
Thus, colleges and universities will remain free to construct some type
of race-preference admissions policy in an effort to ensure diversity among
their classes. Despite the Court's commitment to upholding the narrow use
of race in the admissions process, however, most institutions will be unable
or, more likely, unwilling to construct constitutionally permissible race-
preference admissions programs. The problem lies with the egos and the
budgets of the administrators of today's colleges and universities. The
current quest in academia to climb in the rankings promotes a meritocratic
system in which many African-Americans and Hispanics, who, studies
confirm, perform less well on standardized tests than whites or Asian-
Americans, cannot compete.2 Colleges and universities concerned with
reporting high academic test scores do not admit more than a small number
of students who apply with weaker academic scores, despite their personal
achievement or other indicia of academic success.22 Moreover, institutions
faced with an unprecedented number of applicants cannot commit to a
holistic individualized review because doing so would be extremely costly
and time-consuming.
23
Sadly, the current trend in post-secondary education to race to the top of
the rankings combined with the increase in applications at most academic
institutions is diametrically opposed to constructing a flexible,
individualized, and therefore, constitutionally permissible race-preference
program. Ensuring elite status by admitting students with the highest
standardized test scores yields a racially homogenous entering class.24 The
need for efficiency mandates that colleges and universities define a
standardized test cutoff point for admission to their school, thereby
decreasing the number of students whom the school must consider.
Despite some reports to the contrary, school admissions boards remain
unwilling or uninterested in removing themselves from the ratings game.25
For this reason, regardless of how the Court decides, Fisher will ultimately
governmental interest in viewpoint diversity).
20. See infra notes 296 300 and accompanying text.
21. See THE COLLEGE BOARD, 2012 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS TOTAL GROUP
PROFILE REPORT 4 (2012), available at http://media.collegeboard.com/
digitalServices/pdf/research/TotalGroup-2012.pdf (reporting much lower mean
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores for African-American and Hispanic students
than for white students, across critical reading, math, and writing components of the
SAT).
22. See Sigal Alon & Marta Tienda, Diversity, Opportunity, and the Shifting
Meritocracy in Higher Education, 72 AM. Soc. REV. 487, 489 91 (2007).
23. Id. at 503.
24. See id. at 508.
25. Id.
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be inconsequential to school admissions decision-making and, therefore,
will do little more than highlight the growing irrelevance of affirmative
action jurisprudence.
This article proceeds in three parts. In Part I of this article, I provide a
narrative of affirmative action jurisprudence in higher education, with a
particular focus on the meaning of viewpoint diversity in higher
education.2 6 This section tracks the definitional shift in preference policies
from their original design as remedial and compensatory programs for
those suffering the effects of educational discrimination to interest
convergence programs, which assure equal benefits irrespective of race. In
Part II, I explore the circumstances giving rise to Fisher, including an
overview of the lower court decisions. This section presents a discussion
of the likely outcome of the Fisher case based on past rulings by members
of the current Court and predicts that the Court will decide Fisher on very
narrow grounds.27 In Part III, I explore the underpinnings of the post-
secondary education admissions process. This section explores the
contemporary goals of most institutions' admissions, including their moral
sense of providing a compensatory education to groups that previously
experienced academic disadvantage, the nature of elitism in education
fueled in large part by U.S. News & World Report,28 and the goal of
colleges and universities to admit the most qualified students in the wake of
an ever growing volume of applicants. This section concludes that colleges
and universities, for both financial and egotistical reasons, are more
concerned with their academic reputation than with Constitutional
limitations on their admissions policies, and as a result, for the most part,
colleges and universities will continue to try to use race as a plus,
regardless of any future Supreme Court edict.
I. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ADMISSIONS POLICY JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has expressed little opinion on race-preference
admissions policies in higher education. In fact, over the past forty years,
the Court has taken up the matter only twice." These cases, coupled with
the executive mandate for affirmative action and cases outside the higher
education context, set the precedential stage for the Court's decision in
26. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (discussing viewpoint diversity).
27. See infra notes 246-286 and accompanying text (discussing indicia of each
member of the Court's opinion on affirmative action and the likely outcome).
28. See Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, http://www.usnews.com/
rankings (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (Annually, US ATews & World Report ranks
undergraduate and graduate institutions in the country.).
29. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Note that Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger were decided
on the same day, making the tally really three cases, were decided on the same day,
making the tally really three cases.
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Fisher. In this section, I provide a historical overview of the executive and
judicial decisions that will inform the Court's decision in Fisher.
A. The Civil Rights Movement
The term "affirmative action" first appeared in a 1961 executive order
issued by President John F. Kennedy; it required government contractors to
"take affirmative action to ensure" that individuals are employed and
treated equally without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin."o
Four years later, and one year after Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,1 President Lyndon B. Johnson issued Executive Order 11,246,
which required federal contractors to "take affirmative action" to hire
without regard to race, religion, or national origin.32 Executive Order
11,246, when read with the Civil Rights Act, was meant to guarantee that
companies doing business with the government took active steps toward
recruiting, hiring, and retaining members of underrepresented minority
classes, which had historically been denied access to jobs at a rate equal to
their majority counterparts.
Under Executive Order 11,246, most entities doing business with the
government, or receiving government funding, must develop a written
affirmative action compliance program and must further demonstrate proof
that they are complying with their programs. 33 Following the issuance of
Executive Order 11,246 and the series of compliance rules that were
enacted in response to its adoption, "affirmative action plans" became the
loosely used terminology for any program or methodology designed to
enhance racial, ethnic, and, eventually, female representation in business
and government entities.34
For the ten years following the moment when affirmative action came
into being, affirmative action plans and programs primarily concerned
themselves with commercial entities.35 Executive Order 11,246 was
equally applicable to colleges and universities receiving federal funding,
yet little attention was paid to the educational sector, thereby directing
attention primarily on affirmative action plans to improve diversity in
hiring and employment.36 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
30. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961).
31. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
32. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964-1965) (amended to include
gender in 1968).
33. See Martha S. West, The Historical Roots of Affirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA
L.J. 607, 613-14 (1998) (footnotes omitted) (historical analysis of affirmative action
beginning in the 1700's and continuing to the mixed success of modern affirmative
action programs).
34. See id. (footnotes omitted).
35. Id. at 618 (footnote omitted).
36. Id at 618-19 (footnotes omitted).
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however, prohibited race or national origin discrimination by any program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance, including colleges and
universities, thereby setting the groundwork for affirmative action
admissions plans.3  In 1973, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, interpreting Title VI for the first time, used affirmative action
language when it amended its regulations.38 According to the regulation,
educational institutions found to have had past discrimination were
required to create an affirmative action plan. 39  Those educational
institutions at which the government had not found instances of
discrimination were encouraged to create affirmative action plans.4" By the
mid-1970s, institutions of higher education had embraced the notion of
employing affirmative action admissions programs, which was the name
given to aspects of admissions plans that considered race as a factor in the
admissions process.4
Both educational and commercial affirmative action plans were met with
significant opposition.42 Affirmative action was seen as a zero-sum
game.43 Ensuring the rights of one person meant necessarily disqualifying
the rights of another for the same jobs or place in an entering class. Not
surprisingly, governmental efforts to grant access to those to whom such
access was previously denied based on the color of their skin quickly
became an issue of constitutional scrutiny.
37. Id. at 619 (footnotes omitted).
38. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 n.12, 418 n.22
(1978); see also 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(6)(ii) (2012) ("Even in the absence of such prior
discrimination, a recipient in administering a program may take affirmative action to
overcome the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation by persons
of a particular race, color, or national origin.").
39. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(6)(i) ("In administering a program regarding which the
recipient has previously discriminated against persons on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, the recipient must take affirmative action to overcome the effects of
prior discrimination.").
40. Id. § 80.3(b)(6)(ii). ("Even in the absence of such prior discrimination, a
recipient in administering a program may take affirmative action to overcome the
effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular
race, color, or national origin.").
41. Challenging Race Sensitive Admission Policies: A Summary of Important
Rulings, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sats/race/
summary.html (last visited Sept, 1, 2012).
42. See id (discussing several successful legal challenges to affirmative action
admissions policies); Cedric Herring & Loren Henderson, From Affirmative Action to
Diversity: Toward a Critical Diversity Perspective, 38 CRITICAL Soc. 629, 631 (2011).
43. See Challenging Race Sensitive Admission Policies, supra note 41 (noting that
many opponents of affirmation action admissions policies thought of affirmative action
as reverse discrimination).
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B. University of California v. Bakke
University of California v. Bakke44 was the first affirmative action
challenge to a race-based admissions policy that the Supreme Court
considered on the merits.45 Allan Bakke, a white male, unsuccessfully
applied for admission to the University of California at Davis (Davis)
Medical School in 1973 and in 1974.46 At the time when Bakke applied to
the Medical School, Davis had employed an affirmative action admissions
policy that divided applicants into two groups, minority and majority. 47
The school set aside a certain number of seats for minority members, who
could be admitted even if their undergraduate grade point averages (GPAs)
and Medical College Admission Tests (MCATs) were lower than those of
the applicants rejected from the majority pool. 48 Davis rejected Bakke's
application in both 1973 and 1974, even though the school accepted
minority applicants with lower test scores. 49  Following the second
rejection, Bakke sued Davis and the Regents of the University of California
in state court,50 arguing that the Davis admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause,5 ' the California Constitution,52 and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI).53
44. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see generally Leslie
Yalof Garfield, Squaring Affirmative Action Admissions Policies with Federal Judicial
Guidelines: A Model for the Twenty-First Century, 22 J.C. & U.L. 895 (1996)
(discussing the Bakke decision within the article's analysis of the legal limits on a law
schools' adoption of diversity admissions policies).
45. See Bridgette Baldwin, Colorblind Diversity: The Changing Significance of
"Race " in the Post-Bakke Era, 72 ALB. L. REV. 863, 866 (2009).
46. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276.
47. Id at 274-76. Under a special admissions program, applicants could indicate
on their medical school applications whether they wished to be considered as
"economically and/or educationally disadvantaged". Id at 274. To fall into such a
"minority group", applicants could select one of the following categories: "Blacks",
"Chicanos", "Asians", or "American Indians"; "White" or "Caucasian" was not an
option. Id. (citation omitted). From 1971-1974, only ethnic minority students
obtained admission under the special program, even though disadvantaged white
students also applied to the special program. Id at 275-76.
48. Id. at 275, 277 n.7.
49. Id. at 276-77 (footnote omitted).
50. Id at 277 (footnote omitted).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
52. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(b), reads: "A citizen or class of citizens may not be
granted privileges or immunities not granted on the same terms to all citizens.
Privileges or immunities granted by the Legislature may be altered or revoked."
53. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006), reads:
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of. or be subjected to
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The case made its way to the Supreme Court, which considered both the
Equal Protection claim and the Title VI claim.54 The Court first considered
the proper level of scrutiny for reviewing the challenge.55 A majority of the
Court concluded that because the Davis program considered race, it was
subject to the strictest of scrutiny and would only pass constitutional muster
if it were "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."56
The Court was sharply divided on the constitutionality of the Davis
program. 7 Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court in an
opinion that no other Justice joined.5" Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist concurred in in finding that the program
was unlawful, but based their conclusion that the program violated of Title
VI.59 These five Justices made up the majority necessary to invalidate the
Davis program.
Justice Powell held invalidated the Davis Program invalid, because, in
his opinion, the program violated the Equal Protection Clause.6" He
thought that the Davis policy of setting aside a certain number of seats was
tantamount to a quota and therefore in violation of the Constitution.61 In
his opinion, however, the Constitution does permit some permissible uses
of race in admissions decisions to institutions of higher education.62
Specifically, Justice Powell found "a compelling interest in ameliorating or
eliminating, where feasible, the disabling effects of identified
discrimination."63
Justice Powell paid particular attention to the benefits that both
minorities and the non-minority would experience from learning in a
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
54. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281.
55. Id. at 287 91.
56. Id. at 291, 299. Justice Powell also wrote that in "'order to justify the use of a
suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both
constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is
'necessary ... to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its
interest."' Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 22 (1973) (footnotes
omitted)). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
57. Bakke, 438 U.S. at266 67.
58. Id. at 267.
59. See id. at 408-22 (showing that Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens,
Stewart, and Rehnquist did not reach the constitutional question because they
concluded that the program in Bakke violated Title VI).
60. Id. at 289.
61. Id. at 307; see also 311-14 (stating specific goals or quotas are always
impermissible to achieve diversity or to dismantle past discrimination.).
62. Id. at 315 ("Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range of factors
a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student
body.").
63. Id. at 325.
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classroom filled with diverse voices.64 According to Powell, encouraging
diversity in the student population is a compelling interest that is
sometimes permissible, even if such action results in unequal treatment.65
The majority student would greatly benefit, and his or her educational
training would be enhanced, by having the opportunity to learn, study, and
discuss academic information with students from diverse backgrounds. 66 A
diverse student body contributing to a "robust exchange of ideas" is a
constitutionally permissible goal on which a race-conscious university
admissions program may be predicated."7 The Constitution does not bar
admission policies from introducing race as a factor in the selection
process.
Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Marshall dissented from the
conclusion of the majority but agreed with Justice Powell that race-based
programs are sometimes permissible. 68 The four Justices endorsed most of
Justice Powell's opinion.69 Consequently, following Bakke, later Courts
embraced two principles that stemmed from Justice Powell's opinion.
First, benefits of viewpoint diversity could be considered advantageously in
the admissions process, and second, any affirmative action admissions
policy would be upheld only if it were "precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.""o This language became the basis of
the strict scrutiny test applied to affirmative action programs. A state or
state agency meets the strict scrutiny test when it demonstrates a
compelling governmental interest and shows that the program or policy
developed by the agency was narrowly tailored to help meet that
compelling governmental interest. 1
Justice Powell's opinion shifted the focus of affirmative action
admissions policies from remedial and compensatory programs aimed at
ameliorating present effects of past discrimination to a more neutrally
principled concept. Powell re-envisioned the race-based admissions
programs as offering enhanced learning experiences for all.72 The original
intent of affirmative action admissions programs, to provide opportunities
for those who suffered from educational discrimination in the past,'73 meant
64. Id. at 307.
65. Id at 307.
66. Id
67. Id at 311-13. Justice Powell noted that educational excellence is widely
believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. Id at 313.
68. Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 324 (Brennan, J., concurring).
70. Id at 300.
71. Id at 313.
72. See generally, id at 300-25.
73. See supra Part L.A (outlining the development of affirmative action admissions
programs).
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favoring one group over the other.74 But defining the advantage of race-
preference admissions in terms of a benefit to all, the programs became
more palatable to the majority, who otherwise perceived themselves to be
hurt by a program that benefited other groups at their expense.
Many viewed Justice Powell's shift of affirmative action admissions
policies from a concept designed to eradicate present effects of past
discrimination to one that benefits both whites and blacks equally as the
genesis of "interest convergence," a theory proposed by Derrick Bell that
white people would support racial justice only to the extent that it benefits
them." Justice Powell's advocacy of viewpoint diversity refrained race-
preference admissions policies in terms of the benefits that majority
students would reap from a school's assurance that otherwise
underrepresented minorities would be present in the classroom. His
interest-convergence logic seemed to make the notion of race-preference
admissions policies seemingly more palatable to majority applicants, many
of whom could view race-preference admissions policies as being valuable
to them."
Post-Bakke, the Court embraced Justice Powell's interest convergence
theory of race-preference admissions policies. Consequently, the Court
evaluated the race-preference challenges in terms of the policies' benefit to
majority and minority applicants. This newfound track veered the Court
from the original course set by President Johnson to use race-preference
policies as a means of remedying the present effects of past
discrimination.8 Thus from Bakke forward, colleges and universities could
consider race a "plus" if, in so doing, they created what Jeremiah Chin
termed a moral "mix tape" for the classroom. 9 in other words, through
careful selection of the voices that students heard in the classroom, an
educational experience could be created that is greater than the sum of each
of its individual parts.so
The Court heard its next affirmative action admissions policy cases
74. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297.
75. Id. at 300-25.
76. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) ("The interest of blacks in
achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the
interests of whites.").
77. See, e.g, id. at 532-33 ("Many white parents recognize a value in integrated
schooling for their children [such as in magnet schools] but they quite properly view
integration as merely one component of an effective education.").
78. See, e.g, Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964-1965).
79. Jeremiah Chin, Comment, What a Load of Hope: The Post-Racial Mixtape, 48
CAL. W. L. REv. 369, 369 70 (2012) (discussing post-racial rhetoric-in other words, a
"mixtape" and the lack of discourse on the persistence of racism, even decades after
the Civil Rights Movement).
80. Id at 396.
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twenty-five years after deciding Bakke. In the interim, several circuit
courts took up challenges to affirmative action admission policies,8' and the
Court also defined the constitutional parameters of affirmative action cases
in the workplace.82 But the lower court cases were not binding nationwide,
and the affirmative action challenges in the commercial context, other than
affirming the rational test, were distinguishable.83 Consequently, the
Court's opinion in the twin cases of Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v.
Bollinger84 were the first post-Bakke cases to further shape race-preference
admissions policies.
C. Post-Bakke Decisions
In Grutter and Gratz, the Court considered the constitutionality of
affirmative action admissions programs at the University of Michigan
School of Law ("Law School")85 and the University of Michigan College
of Literature, Science, and Arts ("LSA"),86 respectively. The Supreme
Court heard the cases separately and issued opinions to the two cases on the
same day.87
LSA based its admissions policy on a 150-point scale.88 The admissions
office assigned points based on several factors including high school grade
point average, standardized test scores, high school curriculum, and
81. Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law. Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke authorizes a "properly designed and
operated race-conscious admission program"); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944
(5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was not binding on
the Fifth Circuit); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362,
1368 (S.D. Ga. 2000)(holding that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke regarding a
compelling governmental interest in student diversity "is not binding..although ... it is
persuasive).
82. See e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (reviewing
federal agency contract clause providing financial incentive to hire certified
disadvantaged businesses); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(reviewing city policy requiring that at least thirty percent of any city construction
contract be subcontracted to "Minority Business Enterprises"); United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (reviewing district court order requiring that fifty
percent of promotions to certain ranks within the Alabama Department of Public Safety
be given to qualified black candidates); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986) (reviewing provision in teacher contract which resulted in non-minority teachers
with greater seniority being laid off before minority teachers with lesser seniority); see
generally, Leslie Yalof Garfield, Adding Colors to the Chameleon: Why the Supreme
Court Should Adopt a Compelling Governmental Interest Test for Race-Preference
Student Assignment Plans, 56 U. Kan. L. Rev 277 (2008).
83. See supra note 81.
84. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
85. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
86. Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
87. Grutter and Gratz were both decided on June 23, 2003.
88. Id. at 255.
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underrepresented racial or ethnic background.89 Students from an
underrepresented racial or ethnic background were automatically assigned
twenty points, 90 a potentially significant advantage over students not from
an underrepresented racial or ethnic background.
The Law School admissions program called for the enrollment of a
"critical mass of underrepresented minority students" as a means of
creating a diverse student body. 91  Under the written policy, those
reviewing applications for admission were encouraged to consider factors
including recommendations, quality of the undergraduate institution,
essays, course selection, and whether the applicant had a perspective or
experience that would contribute to a diverse student body.9'
As per Bakke and the ensuing affirmative action cases that the Court
considered in the context of the workplace,93 the Supreme Court reviewed
the Law School and LSA policies, respectively, under the strict scrutiny
test because the plaintiffs in each case challenged the affirmative action
admissions policies as violating of the Equal Protection Clause.94 In both
Grutter and Gratz, the Court swiftly accepted as binding Justice Powell's
majority opinion in Bakke, finding a compelling governmental interest in
achieving a diverse entering class. 95  The Court reached different
conclusions as to whether the admissions policies were narrowly tailored,
choosing to uphold the Law School admissions policy and to invalidate the
89. Id
90. Id. LSA's admissions point system also assigned points based on additional
factors, including alumni relationship, personal essay, and demonstrated leadership
qualities. Id The twenty points automatically assigned to students from an
underrepresented racial or ethnic background could have given those applicants a
significant advantage because applicants with a score of over 100 automatically
received admission to LSA. Id at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Plaintiffs in Gratz challenged LSA's admissions policy under Sections 1981,1983, and
2000d of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 2000d (2000), and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that LSA improperly used
race as a factor in determining admissions. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 252 (majority opinion)
(citation omitted). Under one variation of the admissions policy, the school used a
150-point scale to rate applicants. Id at 294. Applicants were assigned points based
on race. Id at 294-95. The district court upheld the program, and plaintiffs appealed
to the Supreme Court. Id at 258-60. See also Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to Bakke:
Defining the Strict Scrutiny Test for Affirmative Action Policies Aimed at Achieving
Diversity in the Classroom, 83 NEB. L. REv. 631, 655-56 (2005) (discussing the LSA
policy).
91. Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003).
92. Id at 315. The district court struck down the Law School policy finding that it
did not survive the strict scrutiny test. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Id. at 321.
93. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995) (reviewing
allegations of workplace discrimination allocating federal government contracts);
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 163 (1987) (reviewing allegations of
workplace discrimination of government workers).
94. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Gritter, 539 U.S. at 326.
95. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-71; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
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LSA policy.96 Read together, the cases suggest that institutions of higher
education remain free to consider race as one factor among several factors
in the admissions policy so long as the consideration is individualized.97
A majority of the Court struck down the LSA program, finding that it
was overly broad.98 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the
majority opinion in Gratz, the LSA point-allocation policy, which awarded
twenty points to underrepresented minorities, "ensures that the diversity
contributions of applicants cannot be individually assessed" and was
therefore unconstitutional.9
The Court upheld the law school program challenged in Grutter.100
According to Justice O'Connor, who wrote the majority opinion, when
viewed in the context of education,'0 ' the use of race-preference policies is
not objectionable so long as these policies are flexible in a non-mechanical
way. 02 Unlike LSA's policy, which assigned points to an applicant based
on membership in a minority class, the Law School's policy required
admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on all of the
information available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of
recommendation, ... an essay describing [how] the applicant will
contribute to the life and diversity of the Law School ... , and the
applicant's undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School
Admission Test (LSAT) score .... 03
The policy was constitutionally permissible because it did not "define
diversity 'solely in terms of racial and ethnic status' and did not "restrict
the types of diversity contributions eligible for 'substantial weight' in the
admissions process."104 The Law School's policy did, however, "reaffirm
the Law School's ... commitment" to diversity, with "'special reference to
the inclusion"' of African-American, Hispanic, and Native-American
students, who otherwise "'might not be represented in [the] student body in
meaningful numbers.' By enrolling a 'critical mass' of [underrepresented]
minority students, the [policy sought] to 'ensur[e] [the students'] ability
to ... contribut[e]" to the Law School's character and to the legal
96. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-71; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
97. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 269; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 309-10.
98. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 269.
99. Id. at 273 n.20 (citing Id. at 279 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
100. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310.
101. Id. at 327 (holding that "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause" because "[n]ot every decision
influenced by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a
framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons
advanced by the governmental decision-maker for the use of race in that particular
context.").
102. Id., at 333-34.
103. Id. at 315.
104. Id at 316.
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profession. °
5
Justice O'Connor ended her opinion with an expressed hope of eventual
termination of this and all other race-based admissions policies.'° 6
Grutter remains the most recent case to consider race-based admissions
plans at the post-secondary school level. Following Grutter and Gratz,
institutions like the University of Texas devised programs that were holistic
in scope and that considered race as a factor among many when assembling
an entering class.107 Grutter seemed to grant the status of race a kind of
benefit status, similar to that announced by Justice Powell in the Bakke
decision, at least to the extent that race was relevant to a particular
institution's goal of accepting a critical mass of diverse voices. Grutter left
in its wake a clear signal to colleges and universities that Justice Powell's
understanding of the permissibility of race-sensitive admissions policies as
part of an effort to obtain a diverse student body was still the law.
Following Grutter, the Court took up one other education-rooted
affirmative action case. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1..8 concerned two cases from different K-12 school
districts that challenged school districting plans. In one case, parents from
Jefferson County, Kentucky, challenged a school assignment plan that the
School Board adopted as a means to maintain racial equality in the school
in response to a previously issued desegregation order.'0 9  In Seattle,
Washington, parents challenged a plan that used race as one of four
tiebreakers to decide who can attend an oversubscribed district school.''0
In both instances, the school plans were designed to ensure racial diversity
and equal access to the county's best colleges and universities. The Court
heard these cases together.
A narrow majority of the Court voted to invalidate each plan.' Chief
Justice Roberts delivered the majority opinion with respect to several of the
issues presented by the case and a plurality opinion with respect to others
of those issues.1 12 Justice Kennedy was the swing vote, concurring with the
105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 343 ("We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.").
107. See infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text. The University of Texas
adopted its plan before Grutter, but expanded its program to include a holistic review
for those denied admission under the Top Ten Percent plan. See infra notes 119 20.
108. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
109. Id. at 716-18 (summarizing the facts of the Kentucky case) (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 711 15 (summarizing the facts of the Seattle case) (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 707 (5-4 decision) (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined
Chief Justice Roberts in Parts 1, ii, iii A, and iii C of the Court's opinion. Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito also joined the Chief Justice in Parts III-B and IV.).
112. Id.
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judgment but agreeing with only part of the plurality's reasoning."
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter dissented.'14 The entire
Court was in agreement that any educational-assignment program that uses
race must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental
interest.'" The majority view distinguished Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz.'16
Justice Roberts acknowledged that what "was upheld in Grutter was
consideration of 'a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single, though important, element. "117
Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas all agreed with Justice Robert's
conclusion that the only time it would find the use of race justified would
be when the governmental entities defending the policy could establish
proof of de jure segregation.' Given the lack of any such proof, five
Justices concluded that the use of the racial classifications was not
justified.'
Justice Kennedy joined the plurality's judgment but sharply disagreed
with its conclusion that such policies could never pass muster or could do
so under only very limited circumstances.12 0 His concurrence, therefore,
was the fifth vote, the other four being Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Stevens,
and Souter, for holding that instances in which race-preference school-
assignment plans were constitutionally permissible absent de jure
121
segregation.1 Justice Kennedy argued that viewpoint diversity and greater
assurance that institutions not revert to educational segregation are
compelling governmental interest.122
The Parents Involved majority agreed with Justice O'Connor that
context matters when considering equal protection challenges.12 3 Within
the context of race-preference admissions policies, the Court will demand
strict scrutiny review.124 Thus an admissions policy will be upheld if it is
narrowly tailored to meet the compelling governmental interest in assuring
113. See id. at 782-98 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
114. See id at 798-803 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id at 803-76 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsberg, Stevens, and Souter).
115. Id at 720 (citation omitted) (plurality opinion); Id at 783 (citation omitted)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Id. at 803 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
116. Id at 722 25 (plurality opinion).
117. Id at 722 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325).
118. Id at 749 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion).
119. Id. at. 750 (finding no danger of re-segregation in either the Louisville or
Seattle case).
120. Id at 783, 787-88.
121. Id at 820-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("A court finding of dejure segregation
cannot be the crucial variable.").
122. Id. at 783, 787-88.
123. Id. at 725 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-28 (2003)).
124. Id at 720 (citation omitted).
Garfield (Finial). docx (Do Not Delete) 2/14/2013 11:13 AM
HeinOnline  -- 39 J.C. & U.L. 16 2013
2013] INEVITABLE IRRELEVANCE 17
viewpoint diversity."' It is this standard against which the Supreme Court
will evaluate Fisher v. Texas.126
II. FISHER V. TEXAS
On April 7, 2008, attorneys filed suit on behalf of Abigail Fisher and
Rachel Michalewicz against the University of Texas for violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 2  Edward Blum,
the sole proprietor of the Washington, D.C., legal defense fund Project for
Fair Representation, motivated the case.128 Blum put lawyers in touch with
Fisher as a means to challenge, and hopefully end, what he calls reverse
discrimination. 129 His actions were somewhat successful in that he initiated
a Supreme Court challenge to race-preference admissions policies.13 o
Given the narrow ruling of Grutter, there seemed little reason for the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari on Fisher, except for purposes of
prohibiting any consideration of race in admissions decisions.' 3 ' However,
an evaluation of decisions rendered by Justices currently sitting on the
bench suggests that an insufficient number will vote to abolish race-
preference admissions policies wholesale. 132 In this section, I consider the
legal landscape of the Fisher case and provide reasoned support for why
the Court is unlikely to end affirmative action in higher education.
Specifically, I first provide a narrative of the Fisher case to date, including
a description of the UT policy and a brief discussion of both the district and
the circuit court decisions. I then discuss arguments advanced in briefs
submitted by opponents of affirmative action admission programs. Next, I
consider opinions of various judges as they relate to the use of race in the
admissions policy. Finally, I conclude with a prediction that the Court will
125. Id. at 705.
126. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
127. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at
1-2, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No.
1:08-cv-00263-SS).
128. Morgan Smith, One Man Standing Against Race-Based Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
(Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/us/edward-blum-
and-the-project-on-fair-representation-head-to-the-supreme-court-to-fight-race-based-
laws.html?pagewanted all.
129. Id. (With respect to Blum's involvement in the case, the New York Times
noted that it "crown[ed] a two-decade-long devotion to disputing race-based laws.").
130. Id.
131. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Agrees to Reconsider Use of Race in College
Admission Decisions, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2012), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/supreme-court-agrees-to-reconsider-use-of-race-in-
college-admission-decisions/2010/07/28/gIQA2viJRR story.html.
132. See infra Part II.D (evaluating the probable outcome of Fisher, based on
Supreme Court Justices' decisions in similar cases on race-preference admissions
policies).
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uphold the compelling governmental interest in viewpoint diversity but will
invalidate the UT policy on the grounds that it is not narrowly tailored to
meet that need.
A. The University of Texas Race-Preference Admissions Policy
Following Grutter and Gratz, admissions officials at the University of
Texas carefully constructed a race-based admissions plan that they believed
was in compliance with Supreme Court precedent. 13 3 The UT application
process is comprehensive and complicated. Applicants are initially divided
into three pools: (1) Texas residents, (2) domestic non-Texas residents, and
(3) international students. 134 Students compete for admission against others
in their respective pool. 135 Admission for students in the second and third
groups is based solely on academic and personal achievement. 136 The UT
Office of Admissions devised a more comprehensive and complicated
admissions process for in-state residents.' 31 The first prong of the
admissions process is known as the Top Ten Percent Law, which the Texas
legislature adopted in 1997.13' According to the Top Ten Percent Law,
Texas resident-applicants who are in the top ten percent of their high
school class are guaranteed admission to UT. 139 The Top Ten Percent
prong of the two-tiered program yields the "vast majority" of admitted
students. 14 This prong of the admissions program gives no consideration
to race, ethnicity, income level, or life experience.
14 1
Because the Top Ten Percent Law does not yield an entire class, the
admissions committee considers the remaining Texas-resident pool based
on academic and personal achievement indices. 142 The Academic Index is
a "mechanical formula that predicts freshman GPA using standardized test
scores and high school grade point rank. ' 143  If students are further
considered, the admissions officer looks at the applicant's Personal
Achievement index, which is a number based on a student's personal
133. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 218 (5th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 132 U.S. 1536 (2012).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 227.
136. Id. (footnote omitted).
137. See id. (describing admissions process for Texas applicants).
138. Id. at 224.
139. Tamar Lewin, At the University of Texas, Admissions as a Mystery, N.Y TIMES
(Apr. 1, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/education/
university-of-texas-mysterious-admissions-process.html.
140. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 227 (eighty-one percent of UT's 2008 entering class was
admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law).
141. Id. at 224 (a Texas applicant's ranking in high school is the sole determinative
factor for admission to any Texas state university, under the Top Ten Percent Law).
142. Id. at 227.
143. Id. (footnote omitted).
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achievement score and an evaluation of each of a student's two personal
essays.'44 The personal achievement score, which is given slightly greater
weight than the student essays, "is designed to recognize qualified students
whose merit as applicants was not adequately reflected by their Academic
Index."' 45 The admissions staff assigns the score by considering a host of
factors, including demonstrated leadership, awards and honors, work
experience, a "special circumstances" element that may reflect an
applicant's socioeconomic status or his or her high school, and the
applicant's race.146 None of the personal achievement criteria, including
race, are considered in a vacuum or are given extra attention; rather, they
are part of the review that admissions readers conduct for each
application.147 Students are admitted or further considered based on their
academic index.148
B. The Lower Court Decisions
Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz applied to UT and in the winter
of 2008 were denied admission to its fall entering class.149 In April of that
same year, Fisher and Michalewicz brought suit, requesting a preliminary
injunction that would require UT to reevaluate their applications without
considering race as a factor.1"o The plaintiffs alleged that the UT
admissions policies violated their right to Equal Protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981, 1983, and
2000(d).15 1
The Fifth Circuit considered the case against the backdrop of not only
Grutter and Gratz but also Hopwood v. Texas,152 a 1996 federal challenge
to the University of Texas Law School's race-preference program.153 In
1993, Cheryl Hopwood, a white single mother with a handicapped child
144. Id at 227 28 (footnote omitted).
145. Id at 228.
146. Id. (footnote omitted).
147. Id. (footnote omitted).
148. Id. at 229 (footnote omitted) ("Without a sufficiently high [Academic Index]
and well-written essays, an applicant with even the highest personal achievement score
will still be denied admission.").
149. Id. at 217.
150. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at 112, Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex 2009) (No. 1:08-cv- 00263-SS).
151. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Tex. 2009)
[hereinafter Fisher 1], aff'd 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536
(2012).
152. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996) [hereinafter Hi opwood l/].
153. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 569 (W.D. Tex. 1994) [hereinafter
Hopwood l], rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
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applied to the University of Texas School of Law.'54 Hopwood was denied
admission while the school admitted several black and Hispanic students
with lower Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) scores and GPAs than
Hopwood presented.' Hopwood brought an action in district court
challenging the Texas plan under the Equal Protection Clause.'56 Judge
Sam Sparks heard the case at the district level.' He concluded that based
on the Bakke precedent, the UT law school could continue to consider race
a "plus" in the admissions process.' Hopwood appealed.15 9 Judge Smith
writing for the Fifth Circuit reversed this decision."o The court concluded
that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke spoke for himself alone on the
diversity issue and, as a result, was not binding on the court."' Following
the decision, UT could no longer consider race in the admissions process,
and the Texas legislature adopted the Top Ten Percent Law.162  UT
appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.163  Thus, the
somewhat controversial Hopwood decision informed race-preference
admissions policies in the Fifth Circuit until the Court ruled in Grutter that
race could be a factor in the admissions process. 164 It was Grutter,
therefore, and not Hopwood, that served as precedent for the district and
circuit courts.
In Fisher, Judge Sparks once again was charged with hearing and
ultimately passing judgment on the constitutionality of the UT race-
preference program."' As in Hopwood, Judge Sparks favored the
university's policy.166 He denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction and concluded that given the quality of their applications, they
could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.'
154. Id. at 564.
155. Id at 580.
156. Id at 553.
157. Id
158. Id. at 577.
159. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
160. Id. at 935.
161. Id at 944.
162. Tribpedia: Top Ten Percent Rule, TEX. TRIB., available at
http://www.texastribune.org/texas-education/top-ten-percent-rule/about/ (last visited
Nov. 26, 2012).
163. Hopwood v. Texas., 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) [hereinafter Hopwoodlll] (denying
certiorari).
164. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315-17 (2003) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at
317 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
165. Fisher 1, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 589 (W.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd 631 F.3d 213 (5th
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
166. Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587.
167. Id.
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Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish a
substantial likelihood that UT's use of race in undergraduate admissions
unlawfully discriminated in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. 
168
Following the court's denial of the motion for preliminary injunction,
the parties agreed to a bifurcated trial, allowing the court to separately
consider the issues of liability and remedy.169 As to liability, Judge Sparks
measured the UT program against the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny
standard.17 ° Judge Sparks found that the UT decision to consider race as
just one factor in the admissions process was supported by the compelling
governmental interest in the Grutter Court's sanctioned goal of achieving a
critical mass of minority students.' 7 1 In addition, the manner in which UT
considered race was narrowly tailored to meet that compelling
governmental interest because race was only one of seven "special
circumstances" that, together with the personal essays, made up an
applicant's personal index. 172 The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment. 173  The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 174
Judge Higginbotham delivered the opinion of the Court. 175
Judge Higginbotham set out the precedent on which the Court would
rely. 176 Citing Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz as controlling, he wrote that the
Fifth Circuit would apply the Supreme Court's mandate of strict
scrutiny. 17  Thus, it would only uphold the UT policy if it found that it
supported a compelling governmental interest and that the program was
narrowly tailored to meet that interest.1 8 Reiterating the lessons learned
from Grutter and Gratz, Judge Higginbotham wrote: "A race-conscious
admissions program is constitutional only if it holistic, flexible and
individualized."' 1
The opinion overturned Hopwood to the extent that it considered Justice
Powell's separate opinion in Bakke binding. 8 °  Citing Bakke, Judge
Higginbotham held that diversity in education is a compelling interest
because it is essential to the quality of higher education that a university be
168. Id. at 613.
169. Id. at 590.
170. Id. at 599-600.
171. Id. at 604.
172. Id. at 608.
173. Id. at 614. Note that by this point the second plaintiff dropped from the suit.
174. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter
Fisher II], cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 1536 (2012).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 231.
178. Id. at 220.
179. Id. at 221.
180. Id.
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able to pursue the atmosphere of speculation, excitement, and creation that
is promoted by a diverse student body, he said.'"' Student body diversity
better prepares students as professionals."' The opinion, however, seemed
to go beyond adopting Justice Powell's holding that there is a compelling
governmental interest in viewpoint diversity; the court held that "a
university's educational judgment in developing diversity policies is due
deference.""' The court seemed to reduce the burden of showing a
compelling governmental interest with this deference to institutional
judgment.
On the second prong of the compelling governmental interest test, the
court held that narrow tailoring requires that the use of any racial
classifications fit a compelling goal so closely as to remove the possibility
that the motive for classification was illegitimate racial stereotype. 8 4 A
university admissions program is narrowly tailored only if it allows for
individualized consideration of applicants of all races and does not define
an applicant by race; there can be no quota system or fixed number of
bonus points allotted for race."'
The court found that the UT program was narrowly tailored because race
was only one of the elements combined in its Personal Achievement Index
score.' Moreover, the committee never considered race, or any other
personal variable, individually.' The court also weighed the program
against the twenty-five-year sunset hope that Justice O'Connor expressed
in Grutter and found that, although it does not have an end point, the UT
practice of revisiting the need for its policy annually satisfied the court."
The real issue for the appellants, Fisher and Michalewicz, however, was
not whether the UT race-conscious program was constitutionally
acceptable, but rather, whether UT the second tier of its admissions
program at all.'"9 The appellants maintained that the UT Top Ten Percent
Law was sufficient to achieve a critical mass of diverse students on UT's
campus.'90 The thrust of their argument was that given the UT application
of the Top Ten Percent Law, the school was overextending its right to use
racial preference by double-dipping into a second tier of applicants, whose
181. Id.at230-31.
182. See generally id at 232-35.
183. Id. at 231 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)) ("The Law
School's educational judgment ... is one to which we defer .... Our holding today is in
keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic
decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits.").
184. Id
185. Id at 221.
186. Id at 223 24.
187. Id. at 224.
188. Id. at 222.
189. Fisher II, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 607. (W.D.Tex. 2009).
190. Id at 259.
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race or ethnicity could be a considered during UT's admissions process.' 9 '
The Court rejected the appellants' argument. Citing a 2002 UT study
that found that 79% of the University's 5631 classes had zero or one
African-American students, and 30% had zero or one Hispanic students,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that "the Top Ten Percent Law is plainly not the
sort of workable race-neutral alternative that would be a constitutionally
mandated substitute for race-conscious university admissions policies."192
The court acknowledged that the Top Ten Percent Law contributed to an
increase in overall minority enrollment; however, the court found that
"those minority students remain[ed] clustered in certain programs, severely
limiting the beneficial effects of educational diversity."' 93 The court
concluded that with the Top Ten Percent Law and the Grutter-like plan, UT
effectively ensured the type of educational diversity that was
constitutionally permissible and compelling.' 94 For this reason, the court
upheld the UT policy and affirmed the lower court's decision.'95
In a special concurrence, Judge Garza called the decision "a faithful, if
unfortunate, application" of Grutter, which he opined was a "digression in
the course of constitutional law."1 96 Judge Garza took issue with what he
described as the Grutter Court's abandonment of strict scrutiny.1 97
Consequently, he wrote that he "await[s] the Court's return to
constitutional . . .principles."' 98
The decision was contentious in the Fifth Circuit, in part because of
Judge Higginbotham's conclusion that Bakke was binding on it.' 99
Following the decision, one member of the court requested that the court
poll a majority of the bench.20" "[A] majority of the judges who [were] in
regular active service and not disqualified [from the case] [for] having
voted in favor" of the decision denied the petition for a rehearing en
banc.20' In February 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.202
191. See, Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment at 4-5, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 1:08-CV-
00263-SS), 2009 WL 5055457. "The core dispute ... is Plaintiffs claim that UT
Austin does not need [the second tier of its admissions] policy to achieve diversity
[because] the Top 10% law already achieves a critical mass of underrepresented
minorities." Id at 5.
192. Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 2.42.
193. Id at 253 254.
194. Id. at 254.
195. Id. at 247-254.
196. Id. at 247 (Garza, J., concurring).
197. Id at 247 264 (Garza, J., concurring).
198. Id at 266-67.
199. Id at 238.
200. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 644 F.3d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 2011)
[hereinafter Fisher 177] (denying rehearing en banc).
201. Id
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C. Briefs in Support of Fisher
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari on Fisher, did it do so for
the purpose of banning the future use of race in any post-secondary
educational admissions process? A review of Fisher's own brief and those
of supporting amici indicates more concern with the consideration of race
generally than with the UT program. Those briefs seem to focus more on
policy reasons as support for ending affirmative action in higher
education .203
Three themes emerge in the briefs supporting Fisher. First, Grutter was
a very narrow exception to an otherwise comprehensive ban on race
discriminations and that the UT policy goes beyond the limits articulated in
Grutter. 20 4  Second, race-preference programs yield an "academic
mismatch" that actually harms the intended beneficiaries more than they
help them. 2 5 Finally, institutions, in part guided by the courts, have lost
sight of the initial intent of affirmative action policies-to provide remedial
benefits to those who felt the effects of educational discrimination-and by
basing their programs on race and ethnicity, colleges and universities now
provide programs that often benefit individuals who no longer suffer any
educational harm.20 6
202. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (granting certiorari).
203. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct.
1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1882759; Brief of Amici Curiae Members of the
United States Commission on Civil Rights in Support of Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1950270; Brief of
Amici Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, Center for Equal Opportunity, American
Civil Rights Institute, National Association of Scholars and Project 21 in Support of
Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012
WL 1961249.
204. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct.
1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1882759; Brief of Amici Curiae Members of the
United States Commission on Civil Rights in Support of Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1950270; Brief of
Amici Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, Center for Equal Opportunity, American
Civil Rights Institute, National Association of Scholars and Project 21 in Support of
Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012
WL 1961249.
205. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae for the Asian American Legal Foundation and
the Judicial Education Project as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1961250; Brief of
Amici Curiae for Richard Sender and Stuart Taylor in Support of Petitioner, Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2011 WL 5015112.
206. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S.Ct.
1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1882759; Brief of Amici Curiae California
Association of Scholars, Connecticut Association of Scholars, Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence, Reason Foundation, Individual Rights Foundation, and American Civil
Rights Foundation in Support of Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S.Ct.
1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1950267; Brief of Amici Curiae of Mountain
States Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132
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Lawyers representing Fisher and Michalewicz, petitioners to the
Supreme Court, and those who favor their position posit two alternative
legal theories that support their cause. The narrow argument is that the
Fifth Circuit misread Grutter and substituted due deference for compelling
governmental interest. The broader argument is that the Court should,
through Fisher, avail itself of the opportunity to reverse Grutter to the
extent that it contravenes equal protection laws.207
The lower court ruled incorrectly, the argument goes, because it
unconstitutionally expanded the school's role in determining when the use
of race is permissible in admitting students to a public university. The law
is well settled that race-preference programs must be subject to the most
exacting scrutiny.208 Relying heavily on challenges to affirmative action
programs in the workplace, the petitioners cited the Court's commitment to
ensuring that the use of race is for a legitimate purpose.209 Thus, "more
than good motives should be required when the government seeks to
allocate its resources by way of an explicit racial classification."21 0 The
Fisher court's finding that deference is due to the "educational judgment
[of the university] in developing diversity policies" abrogates the strict
scrutiny that an equal protection challenge demands. 211  Extending this
argument further, the petitioners and others argue that, at best, Grutter is
the limit of permissible race preference and Fisher pushed the limit beyond
Grutter, which was intended as a narrow exception to the ban on race
discrimination.2 12
The broader argument for abolishing affirmative action favors the Court
using Fisher as a means to reconsider Grutter. The petitioner's brief fails
to put forth a separate argument to support its assertion, writing only that
"Grutter should be clarified or reconsidered to restore the integrity of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection." 213
On the policy side, several amicus briefs argue that race-preference
affirmative action programs are detrimental to the population that the
programs seek to benefit. The most dominant theme in this argument is the
idea of academic mismatch, highlighted most clearly in the brief submitted
S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1950269.
207. See, e.g, Brief for Petitioner at 53, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S.
Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1882759.
208. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978).
209. See, e.g, Brief for Petitioner at 33, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S.
Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1882759.
210. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (quoting Drew
S. Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 485 (1987)).
211. Fisher I, 631 F.3d at 231.
212. See e.g, Brief for Petitioner at 52, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct.
1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1882759.
213. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 35, Fisher v. Univ. ofTex. at Austin, 132 S.
Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345) 2011 WL 4352286 (citation omitted).
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by Stuart Taylor and Richard Sander, in support of the petitioners'
argument.214 According to the academic mismatch theory, granting some
students an advantage over others in the admission process because of their
race results in admitting them to colleges and universities for which they
are not academically prepared." Consequently, those students do not
perform as well in class as regularly admitted students do, resulting in a
less rigorous course load and ultimately to an inferior quality of work as
compared to those admitted with higher test scores. 216 In its brief, the
United States Commission on Civil Rights, an independent commission of
the federal government that is said by some to have a conservative bias,
argued that the lower grades resulting from academic mismatch leads to
lower self-confidence and is therefore contrary to the best interests of
minority students."
Almost every brief submitted in support of the academic mismatch
theory cited statistics to support their argument. Most common among the
briefs were the findings of a University of California study completed after
implementation of Proposition 209, in 1996, the state initiative that
prohibited state government institutions from considering, race, sex, or
ethnicity in public education (also in employment and contracting). 218 The
2011 study considered African-American and Hispanic students enrolled in
214. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 133, at 21. The report was based in large part on
Sander's work on academic mismatch in the law school settings. In elite law schools,
51. 6 % of African-American law students had first year GPAs in the bottom 10% of
their class as opposed to 5 .6% of white students. Sander found that these results were
almost entirely because of affirmative action. If African-American students with the
same credentials were attending the mid-tier institutions, instead of the elite ones with
affirmative action policies, they would be doing well. Richard H. Sander, A
Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV.
367, 427 (2004).
215. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 214 at 6. See also Sander, supra note 214 (analyzing
affirmative action in law school context).
216. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 214, at 6.
217. Brief of Amici Curiae of Gail Herot, Peter Kirsanow & Todd Gaziano,
Members of the United States Commission on Civil Rights in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 214, at 18-19.
218. Cal Freshman Admissions for Fall 2008, UNIV. OF CAL.,
http://www.ucop.edu/news/factsheets/fall2008adm.html; see also Peter Arcidiacono,
Esteban Aucejo, Patrick Coate & V. Joseph Hotz, The Effects of Proposition 209 on
College Enrollment and Graduation Rates in California, (March 2012) (unpublished
article) (https://www.princeton.edu/economics/seminar-schedule-by-
prog/applied micros-sl2/Prop 209 Paper 03-31-12.pdf). "With regard to the first
one-did better student-campus matching on academic preparation account for the net
effect Prop 209 had on minority graduation rates-the answer is: "yes somewhat." Id.
at 31.
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California state colleges and universities. 9 At that time, admissions offers
made by the University of California at Berkeley (Berkeley) to African-
Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans went from 23.1% to
10.4%.22° Instead, less highly ranked institutions, such as the University of
California at San Diego (UCSD) and the University of California Los
Angeles (UCLA) accepted the students who did not receive acceptance
offers from Berkeley.221  The study suggested that the academic
performance of African-American students enrolled in these less elite
institutions improved dramatically. 2 2  According to the study, which
looked closely at graduation rates among the UC campuses, minority
students were more likely to graduate from academic institutions that
matched students based on their pre-college academic preparedness. 223
These findings supported the authors' conclusion that, "Proposition 209 led
to a more efficient [academic] sorting of minority students. 224
The final argument in favor of abolishing affirmative action comes not
from the amicus brief but from Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Gratz.2 25 Citing Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained the concern in focusing purely on race in the admissions process:
The Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might
find itself forced to choose between A, the child of a successful black
physician in an academic community with promise of superior academic
performance, and B, a black child who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of
semi-literate parents whose academic achievement was lower but who had
demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an apparently abiding
interest in black power .... If C, a white student with extraordinary artistic
talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his unique quality
might give him an edge over both A and B. Thus, the critical criteria are
often individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but
sometimes associated with it.226
Chief Justice Rehnquist used this hypothetical to illustrate the potential
for race-preference policies to grant benefits to those who might not have
suffered the ills of a poor education.227 Many anti-affirmative actionists
219. Arcidiacono, supra note 218 at 1.
220. Final Summary of Freshman Applications, Admissions and Enrollment, Fall
1989-2011, Univ. of Cal., 2, 5 (2012).,
http://www.ucop.edu/news/factsheets/201 I/Flow FROSH CA 11.pdf
221. Arcidiacono, supra note 218.
222. Id. at 3.
223 Id. at 2, 33.
224 Id. at 3.
225. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 272 73 (2003) (citing Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978)).
226. Id. (citing Bakke 438 U.S. at 324).
227. Id. (citing Bakke 438 U.S. at 324).
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subscribe to this theory and claim that in today's post-racist world, many
black students can compete with their white counterparts, and
consequently, they should not be at an advantage.228 Conversely, many
white students suffer from poverty and poor access to education, yet under
race-preference policies, they are not entitled to admissions preference.22 9
Indeed, Cheryl Hopwood was an out-of-work, single mother of three
children, one of whom was severely handicapped at the time that Hopwood
applied to UT's law school. 230 Her status, opponents of race-preference
admissions policies are quick to point out, did not qualify her for special
consideration or any type of "plus." 231
Some argue that the past half-century of societal changes should also
give pause to those who favor the original intent of race-preference
policies."' The increase in biracial marriage had diluted the need to grant
preferential treatment based on race.233 Interracial marriage, and
consequently the number of interracial children, has risen dramatically over
the past fifty years.234 The Court's decision striking down miscegenation
statutes and a general increase in tolerance toward diversity have yielded a
population that is quite different from the polarizing racial divide of the
pre-Civil Rights Era.235
Much has been made of the interracial issue, most notably by Kevin
Brown, who argues that a problem with race-based affirmative action
comes with the way in which applicants self-identify.236 According to
Brown, the policies help all people who identify themselves as black, while
some of those people may be biracial, such as President Obama, and
brought up by a white family.237 These students, therefore, have not faced
228. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273.
229. Id.
230. Leslie Y. Garfield, Hopwood v. Texas: Strict in Theory or Fatal in Fact, 34
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 497, 499 n.1 1(1997).
231. Id. at 499, 505.
232. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, Should Black Immigrants be Favored over Hispanics
and Black Multiracials in the Admissions Process of Selective Higher Education
Programs?, 54 How. L. J. 255 (2011) (arguing that black immigrants should not be
favored).
233. Id. at 272, n.79.
234. Id. at 289.
235. Wendy Wang, The Rise of Intermarriage, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 16,
2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/02/16/the-rise-of-
intermarriage/5/#chapter-4-public-attitudes-on-intermarriage; Jeffrey Passel, Gretchen
Livingston & D'Vera Cohn, Explaining Why Minority Births Now Outnumber White
Births, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 17, 2012),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/05/17/explaining-why-minority-births-now-
outnumber-white-births/.
236. See Brown, supra note 232, at 267.
237. Id. at 263, 267, n.412.
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the stereotypical discrimination of blacks in America.13 1 Others could be
recent immigrants from areas of the Caribbean and have not come from
families who experienced racial discrimination in that country.2 39 Biracial
children and children of immigrants, it is argued, do not experience the
disadvantages of poor black children who are the product of generations of
poverty and discrimination stemming from slavery.240 Because of this
difference, Brown maintains that race-based affirmative action does not
focus on helping the most deserving.241
Opponents of race-preference admissions policies have provided the
Court with several arguments upon which the Court can rely. First, they
urge the Court to adopt Petitioners' brief and to find that Judge
Higginbotham improperly granted deference to UT.242 Alternatively, they
argue that the Court can adopt the argument of some amicus briefs that,
based on statistical findings that race-preference admissions policies are
detrimental to those whom they intend to benefit, there is no longer a
compelling governmental interest in using race as one way to achieve
viewpoint diversity. 243  Finally, the Court can adopt the argument
advocated by other amicus briefs that race-preference policies are irrelevant
because a population of today's post-Civil Rights Era blacks does not
necessarily reflect the type of student contemplated when these policies
were first put in place.2 44
D. Probable Outcome of Supreme Court Review
The lower court decisions in the Fisher case present the Court with
several options: the Court can uphold UT's policy and reaffirm Grutter;
alternatively, the Court can uphold the use of race-preference policies
based on a reaffirmation of a compelling governmental interest in
viewpoint diversity but strike down the UT policy for its failure to be
narrowly tailored; the Court can dismiss the petition for certiorari in Fisher
as improvidently granted; the Court can strike down Judge Higginbotham's
findings and limit its decision to reversing and remanding the Fifth Circuit
decision; the Court can use Fisher as an opportunity to reverse Grutter and
rule that the use of race is prohibited in admissions considerations.




242. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 47, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S.
Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1882759.242.
243. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, Center for Equal
Opportunity, American Civil Rights Institute, National Association of Scholars and
Project 21 in Support of Petitioner at 7, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct.
1536 (2012) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1961249.
244. Id. at 24.
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Given the Supreme Court's current composition, it is unlikely that the
Court will uphold the lower court decision in Fisher and find the UT
admissions policy constitutional. The bigger question is, in striking down
Fisher, how far the Justices will go to dismantle the use of race-preference
policies. Eight justices will hear the case because Justice Kagan has
recused herself from the case.245 In light of these Justices' opinions and
writings, the most likely scenario is that while the Court will strike down
the UT policy, it will probably retain the idea that there is a compelling
governmental interest in viewpoint diversity, thereby leaving colleges and
universities free to enact future programs.
Justice Ginsburg will most certainly vote in favor of the UT policy.
Ginsburg is the only member of the current Court who voted to uphold both
LSA and the Law School's admissions policy when they were before the
Court in 2003.246 In Grutter, Justice Ginsburg wrote that "some minority
students are able to meet the high threshold requirements set for admission
to the country's finest undergraduate and graduate educational institutions.
As lower school education in minority communities improves, an increase
in the number of such students may be anticipated. ' 247  Until then,
according to Justice Ginsburg, the compelling governmental interest in
ensuring access to education to all remains in full stead.248 The state of
education has not changed significantly enough to encourage Justice
Ginsburg to retreat from her stance, 24 9 and for this reason, she is likely to
approve the UT policy.
Justices Breyer and Kennedy have expressed a commitment to viewpoint
diversity as a compelling governmental interest. 250  Justice Breyer's
separate opinion in Gratz makes clear that he, like Justice O'Connor, might
have upheld the LSA policy if it had considered various diverse
qualifications of each applicant, including race, on a case-by-case basis.25'
He held that there is a compelling governmental interest in an effort to help
245. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (granting cert.).
246. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J. concurring),
and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 291 (2003) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
247. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 345.
249. Id. at 348 (Ginsburg J., concurring); see also Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee,
Historic Reversals, Accelerating Resegregation, and the Need for New Integration
Strategies, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (Aug. 2007),
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k- 12-education/integration-and-diversity/
historic-reversals-accelerating-resegregation-and-the-need-for-new-integration-
strategies-i/orfield-historic-reversals-accelerating.pdf; see also Emily Richmond,
Schools Are More Segregated Today than During the Late 1960s, THE ATLANTIC (June
11, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/schools-are-more-
segregated-today-than-during-the-late- 1960s/258348/.
250. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783 (2007).
251. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 278 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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create citizens better prepared to know, understand, and work with people
of all races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind of democratic
government that our Constitution foresees.2 52
Justice Kennedy has repeatedly endorsed the compelling governmental
interest in viewpoint diversity.253 Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
Gratz, while striking down the LSA policy, conceded that there is a
compelling governmental interest in viewpoint diversity.254 Justice
Kennedy reaffirmed his commitment to viewpoint diversity in Parents
Involved when he wrote that the "highest aspirations [for an integrated
educational system] are yet unfulfilled."25 5 His dissent in Grutter makes it
clear that he would uphold race-conscious admissions as part of a strategy
for achieving viewpoint-diversity as a compelling governmental interest:
"Our precedents provide a basis for the Court's acceptance of a university's
considered judgment that racial diversity among students can further its
educational task . ...
But Justice Kennedy stated that the use of race to ensure diversity can
be sustained only if a school has empirical evidence to support its need.2 57
In Justice Kennedy's opinion, the Grutter majority confused deference to a
university's definition of its educational objective with deference to the
implementation of this goal.258 In the context of university admissions, he
said, the objective of racial diversity can be accepted based on empirical
data.259 In Grutter, however, the law school did not demonstrate that it
lacked the diversity to justify its plan and, thus, its race-conscious policy
was not narrowly tailored.260 In his dissent, Justice Kennedy also voiced
concerns that the majority abandoned the strict scrutiny and granted too
much deference to the University of Michigan.261 In his view, the majority
in Grutter was flawed because it did not properly apply the strict scrutiny
test.262
252. Id. at 270.
253. Justice Kennedy joined the majority in Gratz and filed a dissenting opinion in
Grutter.
254. Compare Gritter, 539 U.S. at 378-84, with Gratz, 539 U.S. at 245.
"Petitioners further argue that 'diversity as a basis for employing racial preferences is
simply too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest
capable of supporting narrowly-tailored means.' But for the reasons set forth today in
Gritter v. Bollinger, ante, the Court has rejected these arguments of petitioners."
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268 (internal citations omitted).
255. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
256. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
257. Id at 388.
258. Id at 387.
259. Id. at 388.
260. Id. at 391.
261. Id. at 394.
262. Id at 389.
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The opinions of Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas seem more
antithetical to the constitutional use of race as one consideration in the
admissions process. Public perception of Justice Scalia is that he would be
constitutionally critical of anything short of a pure meritocratic admissions
policy.263 Justice Scalia's position must be evaluated based on his dissent
in Grutter because he did not offer independent opinions in either Gratz or
Parents Involved. In Grutter, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority, who
acknowledged the compelling governmental interest in viewpoint
diversity. 264 His issue was with how the Court went about finding what
type of program would support that compelling governmental interest. 265
According to Justice Scalia, the concern was more with setting a high
academic bar so as to meet a particular level of educational elitism, which,
due to the disproportionate performance of minorities on admissions-
related exams, necessitated giving minorities some kind of admissions
boost to guarantee their representation on the campus. 266 In his writings as
a professor at the University of Chicago, Justice Scalia wrote that he
strongly favored what might be termed "affirmative action programs" to
help the poor or disadvantaged.267
Justice Thomas also seems more concerned with the way in which
colleges and universities go about trying to admit a diverse student body.
In Grutter, he agreed with the majority opinion so far as it prohibits the use
of race as a blanket criterion for admissions, signaling that he would not
uphold a race-preference policy that gave blanket consideration to
candidates based on membership in a particular racial or ethnic group.268
Justice Thomas went beyond his colleagues in Gratz, in which he did find a
compelling governmental interest in diversity, but added that "a State's use
of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is categorically
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause."269
Chief Justice Roberts was not on the Court when Grutter or Gratz were
decided but wrote the opinion in Parents Involved, an opinion which
signaled an acceptance, if not an endorsement, of viewpoint diversity.270
Despite the Court's finding that the school assignment plans violated the
Equal Protection clause, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Alito,
263. See Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: "In Order to Get Beyond Racism,
We Must First Take Account of Race, " 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 147, 156 (1979) ("1 am, in
short, opposed to racial affirmative action for reasons of both principle and
practicality").
264. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
265. Id. at 347-48. (Scalia, J. concurring).
266. Id at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting). .
267. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 263, at 156.
268. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
269. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring).
270. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 707
(2007).
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Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy reaffirmed the Court's recognition of a
compelling governmental interest in diversity in the context of higher
education.27 ' In Roberts' model, viewpoint diversity arguably expanded
beyond race and "encompass[es] 'all factors that may contribute to student
body diversity."' 272
There is little that can be gleaned from Justice Alito on the bench
because he did not participate in either Grutter or Gratz. Justice Alito
joined Chief Justice Roberts in the Parents Involved decision but did not
offer a concurrence.273 Alito has, however, weighed in on the matter in
other contexts. As Solicitor General during the Reagan administration, for
example, Justice Alito submitted a brief in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education,2 4 arguing that affirmative action was not justified by the lone
fact that minorities were underrepresented.275
Justice Sotomayor has not yet voted on any race-preference admissions
cases. She has, however, provided insight into her opinions through
comments and speeches that she has made regarding the issue of
affirmative action.276 According to Sotomayor, the use of race in university
admissions is constitutional as set forth in the Court's opinion in Grutter.
277
Proudly referring to herself as an "affirmative action baby," Justice
Sotomayor has said that we cannot achieve quality without providing some
271. Id. at 708, 722.
272. Id. at 722 (citing Gritter, 539 U.S. at 337). The diversity interest was not
focused on race alone but encompassed "all factors that may contribute to student body
diversity." We described the various types of diversity that the law school sought:
"[The law school's] policy makes clear there are many possible bases for diversity
admissions, and provides examples of admittees who have lived or traveled widely
abroad, are fluent in several languages, have overcome personal adversity and family
hardship, have exceptional records of extensive community service, and have had
successful careers in other fields. ... To the extent the objective is sufficient diversity
so that students see fellow students as individuals rather than solely as members of a
racial group, using means that treat students solely as members of a racial group is
fundamentally at cross-purposes with that end."
Id. at 733.
273. See id. at 707.
274. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
275. See Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5,
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (No. 84-1340), 1985 WL
669739.
276. See, e.g., Brandon Paradise, Racially Transcendent Diversity, 50 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 415, 478 79 (2012).
277. Id. at 478 79.
[I]n a speech at Kansas State University, Justice Sotomayor stated, in
connection with affirmative action, that the United States still has 'structural
problems in the society that have to be addressed before we reach full equality
.... We can't live in a society where the poorest children are the poorest
educated.'
ld. at 479.
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advantage to those not properly schooled in gaming the college admissions
system. 2 78 Sotomayor's comments before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
who approved her nomination to the Supreme Court, also shed some light
on her pro-affirmative action stance. 279  The Committee questioned
Sotomayor on her position280 concerning Ricci v. DeStefano, 2 ' a case
brought by a white firefighter who, despite his dyslexia, received a higher
score than a minority peer on a promotion exam but was passed over for
282promotion. Sotomayor expressed support for New Haven's desire to
prevent disparate impact of the New Haven Firefighters' entrance exam by
adopting race-conscious measures designed to benefit racial minorities.28 3
In rendering its decision in Fisher, the Court is likely to pass on the issue
of strict scrutiny first. Based on their writings, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Kennedy, and Sotomayor are all likely to uphold the Court's compelling
governmental interest in viewpoint diversity. Although Chief Justice
Roberts has shown no inclination to rule with these four Justices, his recent
opinion in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius 284
indicates that he may become more liberal in his constitutional
interpretation. 28 5 Regardless of whether Roberts agrees, when a Court
splits 4-4 on an issue, the previous precedent remains the law. Thus, the
result following Fisher will be that there remains, under the law, a
compelling governmental interest in viewpoint diversity.2 86
If a majority of the Court concludes that there is a compelling
governmental interest, it will turn its attention to whether UT demonstrated
that its plan was narrowly tailored to meet that interest. Judge
Higginbotham suggested that the University was in the best position to
decide whether its policy was the most narrowly tailored, thereby granting
it "due deference" with respect to the issue. 287 Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Scalia may well take issue with
278. See id.
279. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Lion. Sonia Sotomavor, to Be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing on S. 503
Before the S Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009).
280. See, e.g, id. at 64-65 (questioning Justice Sotomayor on Ricci v. DeStefano).
281. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
282. Id at 562-63, 567-68.
283. See Leyland Ware, Ricci v. DeStefano: Smoke, Fire and Racial Resentment, 8
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2011) (a group of white and Hispanic firefighters
received the highest scores on two civil service examinations and claimed that the City
of New Haven, Connecticut, discriminated against them because of race.).
284. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
285. See id at 2608 (upholding the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act
of 2010 as a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power).
286. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding that
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fully applicable to the states by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment)).
287. FisherlI, 631 F.3d at 231.
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Judge Higginbotham, thereby agreeing with Fisher that the circuit court
decision abandons strict scrutiny in favor of due deference. Justice Breyer
may agree. In so doing, the Court can reverse the Fifth Circuit's Fisher
decision while leaving the compelling governmental interest in diversity
education intact.
In addition to finding that Judge Higginbotham did not provide the
appropriate level of scrutiny, the Court may conclude that UT's program is
not narrowly tailored. Fisher argues that it was unconstitutional to
"overlay" race preference policies on top of the Texas Top Ten Percent
program.2 88 According to her, the Texas Top Ten Percent Law is a race-
neutral way to ensure that there is diversity in its classroom.289 Given the
use of the Texas Top Ten Percent Law, UT cannot also use the race-
preference policy that it put in place for those who were not admitted under
the Top Ten Percent Law. The issue for the Court is less about whether UT
can layer its program and more about the way in which UT conducted its
layering.
To meet the criteria set forth in Grutter and Gratz, UT must first
demonstrate that its use of race preferences is flexible and non-
mechanical. 29 0  Those in favor of upholding the UT policy will find
comfort in the fact that the policy is non-mechanical. 9 1 Justice Breyer, in
joining Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Gratz, rejected the LSA policy
because it automatically assigned points and, therefore, "unlike the law
school . . . , [did] not provide for a meaningful individualized review of
applicants."292 UT's Personal Achievement Index is similarly non-
mechanical in that it also provides for individual review. 29 3 Admissions
officers review a host of what it terms special circumstance sub-factors,
including race,294 holistically to "develop an applicant's Personal
Achievement Index.29 5  The school's policy of applicant by applicant
consideration of any special sub-factors with which the applicant presents
288. Id at 243.
289. Id at 242 n.156.
290. Id. at 221; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
291. See Fisher 1, 631 F.3d. at 227.
292. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276-277 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
293. Fisher I, 631 F.3d at 228.
294. Defendant's Brief in Opposition, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (U.s. 2011)
2011 WL 6146835 at 5. UT added to UT, race was added to the list of the schools
"special circumstance" sub factors, following Grutter. Id. at 6.
295. Following Grutter, UT launched an extensive review to determine whether its
admissions policies adequately served its broad interest in diversity. UT commissioned
a thorough study to evaluate diversity throughout the University, in various
departments and colleges and within individual classrooms. The university consulted
with legal scholars to interpret Gutter and with students, faculty members and a leading
expert on holistic review to evaluate whether UT was attaining the educational benefits
on diversity. Id.
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closely reflects the individual, non-mechanical review of Grutter, and for
that reason, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor may well find that
UT meets these criteria.
A positive vote from three Justices on the issue of whether the UT policy
is narrowly tailored will still result in the invalidation of the UT policy.
Even if one or more Justices are likely to find that the program is non-
mechanical, most will find that it suffers from inflexibility. According to
the Grutter majority, a flexible program is one that is not fixed on
admitting a certain number of minority students.296 What made the Grutter
program attractive to the Court was that the school was willing to review
the program often, through the admissions season.29  But to Justice
Kennedy, even the continual review of the number of students admitted to
UT to contribute to a diverse voice was inadequate.2 98 In his mind,
obtaining a critical mass is tantamount to setting a goal, and therefore,
regardless of individual review, race has to become an impermissibly
important factor to achieve the "critical mass" that the University may
deem necessary.299 In Grutter, Justice Kennedy also demanded empirical
proof from the law school that it needed the program before he would pass
the narrowly tailored prong.3"'
A majority of the Court hearing this case is unlikely to retreat from its
previously articulated finding that there is a compelling governmental
interest in viewpoint diversity."' The majority is, however, likely to strike
down the decision of the lower court for deferring to the UT policy under
the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test. The Court may
further rule that the UT policy was not narrowly tailored, thereby
prohibiting the school's use of the challenged program. For this reason,
following Fisher, institutions may remain free to consider race in the
admissions process, if only in a limited way.
III. THE INEVITABLE IRRELEVANCE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
JURISPRUDENCE
To some of those following affirmative action disputes, the Court's
decision to grant certiorari in Fisher30 2 signaled the end of affirmative
action. With Chief Justice Roberts at the helm, they thought that the Court
would eliminate an institution's ability to use race as a variable in
admissions decisions. Closer scrutiny of past decisions, however, reveals
296. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335.
297. Id. at 342-43.
298. Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 389, 392.
300. Id. at 388.
301. Id. at315-17.
302. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (granting certiorari).
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that although the UT policy is unlikely to survive the present challenge, the
Court will not slam the door on the consideration of race in admissions
decisions.303
Following Fisher, colleges and universities may be likely to remain free
to consider race in the admissions process, if only in a limited way. Thus,
the issue becomes how the Fisher decision, by upholding the compelling
governmental interest in viewpoint diversity, might inform colleges and
universities as they proceed to develop new race-preference admissions
policies. The likely answer to this question is: not very much.
In theory, Fisher, particularly as it will be read with Grutter and Gratz,
could provide a workable framework for institutions that want to ensure a
diverse entering class. This framework would require individual review of
every applicant and a decreased reliance on a purely meritocratic
admissions process. But today's academic climate holds little value for
colleges and universities, particularly elite academic institutions that
choose to structure their respective admissions processes in a
constitutionally workable manner.
One reading of affirmative action jurisprudence is that institutions
interested in adopting constitutionally permissible admissions programs can
shift the focus from race-based admissions policies to socioeconomic-based
admissions plans.304 Alternatively, colleges and universities can abandon
their meritocratic admissions plans in favor of individual review that values
all factors equally, rendering unnecessary the "plus" factor of meritocratic
admissions policies.305
Colleges and universities, however, are unlikely to adopt either of these
solutions. Some scholars argue that adopting a socioeconomic admissions
program may not yield the critical-mass-type of racial diversity that is
arguably essential to viewpoint diversity. 306  Abandoning meritocratic
303. See, e.g, Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)
(laying out the standard for constitutional use of race in admissions).
304. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1978).
305. See id. at 317.
306. See Deborah Malamud, Class Privilege in Legal Education: A Response to
Sander, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 729 (201 1).See Tung Yin, A Carbolic Smoke Ballfor the
Nineties: Class-Based Affirmative Action, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 213 (observing that in
any particular socioeconomic strata of law school applicants, "whites swamp [[minority
applicants]] in numbers, so their greater diversity gets lost in the broader pool");
Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 472, 494--98, 492-94 (1997) (providing statistical support for the conclusion that
a socioeconomic based affirmative action admissions policy would yield a less diverse
class than a race-based affirmative action admissions policy); Richard H. Sander, Class
in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 645 (2011) (providing
statistical support for his conclusion that institutions favor admitting law students based
on race rather than socioeconomic status, despite presenting with similar LSAT scores);
and Yin, supra, at 235 (noting that the beneficiaries of class-based affirmative action
"are likely to be overwhelmingly white"); see also Malamud, supra, at 731 (arguing
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admissions policies is antithetical to the modern institutional goal of
retaining, or obtaining, nationally recognized "elite" status.
Indeed, over the past few decades, both applicants and post-secondary
institutions have placed an unhealthy emphasis on national rankings.3 0
Media outlets, such as U.S. News & World Report, have taken to ranking
institutions on a host of factors, placing heavy reliance on the mean grade
point average and standardized test scores of the entering class.0 s
Unfortunately, the wide-spread goal among a majority of colleges,
universities, and graduate schools to "rise in the rankings" is antithetical to
admitting students with noncompetitive Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)
scores; due to the racial gap between mean test scores on the SAT, many of
the students denied admission in this way will be minority students.3 09
that elite law schools would be unlikely to alter their middling socioeconomic status
enrollments). Given the heavy reliance that U.S. News & World Report places on an
applicant's Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score, colleges and universities will look to
admit those students who perform best on the SAT. See Richard Perez-Pefia & Daniel
E. Slotnick, Gaming the College Rankings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, at A14,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01 /education/gaming-the-college-
rankingscollegerankings.html. Among those test takers who had a reported family
income of $0-$20,000 per year, the mean test score for white test takers was
significantly higher than that of minority test takers:
Critical Reading Mathematics Writing
White 433 461 428
African-American 399 402 391
Hispanic 416 411 411
THE COLLEGE BOARD, 2012 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE
REPORT 4 (2012), available at http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/
research/TotalGroup-2012.pdf (identifying SAT test takers by ethnicity and
income level). While the number of test takers at or below poverty level was
comparable for those identifying themselves as African-American or Caucasian,
the number of students from families reporting higher incomes was not.
307. Richard Perez-Pefia & Daniel E. Slotnick, Gaming the College Rankings,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2012, at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01 /education/gaming-the-college-
rankingscollegerankings.html (citing numerous examples of college misconduct
directed at advancing in college rankings, including 1) lona College, admitting that
employees had lied for years about, among other things, test scores, graduation rates,
and freshman retention rates, as well as 2) Claremont McKenna College, whose Vice
President & Dean of Admissions inflated average SAT scores provided to U.S. News &
World Report for years); See also infra note 344 and accompanying text (discussing
the focus of admissions offices on climbing the U.S. News & World Report rankings).
308. Robert Morse, Methodology: Undergraduate Criteria and Weights, U.S. News
& World Report, Sept. 11, 2012, available at http://www.usnews.com/education/best-
colleges/articles/2011/09/12/methodology-undergraduate-ranking-criteria-and-weights-
2012.308.
309. See Daniel Koretz, The Impact of Score Differences on the Admissions of
Minority Students: An Illustration, I Nat'l Bd. on Educ. Testing & Pub. Pol'y 5 (2002)
(discussing the difference found on tests of academic achievement between non-Asian
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The academic admissions process, when measured against the current
trend to seek national recognition for academic elite status, reveals the
inconsequential nature of race-preference affirmative action admission
policies. In this section, I demonstrate why institutions will continue to
adopt race-preference admissions policies as a complement to their
meritocratic process. I first highlight the nature of the academic
admissions process. I then consider a constitutional alternative that will
likely be available to colleges and universities following the Fisher
decision. Finally, I conclude by explaining why, given the rise in the
importance of reputational surveys, any decision by the Court regarding
race-preference admissions policies will not have much impact on how
colleges and universities choose which students to admit.
A. The Nature of the Admissions Process
The need for preference admissions policies stems from the meritocratic
nature of post-secondary institutions' admission programs. Colleges and
universities place the greater weight of their admissions policies on
objective factors, such as standardized test scores and GPAs.31° The reason
for placing such emphasis on these objective scores is twofold. First, given
the sheer number of applicants, threshold GPAs and SATs gave an
arbitrary cutoff point below which colleges and universities did not have to
consider students, thereby shrinking the reviewable applicant pool. 311
Second, the use of standardized and objective factors supports the
meritorious nature of admissions.3 12 Those who worked hard received the
right to study in a school with the most academically achieving students.
minority and majority students); The Widening Racial Scoring Gap on the SAT College
Admissions Test, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., http://www.jbhe.com/features/
49_college admissions-test.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2012) (providing statistical
support for the conclusion that African-American and Hispanic students lag in SAT
scores behind majority students).
310. GEORGE H. HANFORD, LIFE WITH SAT: ASSESSING OUR YOUNG PEOPLE
AND OUR TIMES 90 (1991) (According to former College Board President George
Hanford, "the SAT served as the most widely used and possibly the most important
single talent search device the country had."); William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner,
How the SAT Creates "Built-In Headwinds ": An Educational and Legal Analysis
of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131, 135 (2002) (calling the SAT
the "gatekeeper of higher education") (citation omitted); Rachel Moran, Sorting
and Reforming: High Stakes Testing in Public Schools, 34 AKRON L. REV. 107, 110
(2000) (observing that SATs have become "a fixture of the college application
process"); see Theodore M. Shaw, Comments of Theodore M. Shaw, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 489, 492 (SUMMER 1999) ("[W]e have increasingly become a
society run as a testocracy where ... opportunit[y] ... depends, in large part, on..
how [well] one performs on standardized tests.").
311. See, e.g., Kidder & Rosner at 205 (citing Florida's use of a 1270 SAT
cutoff score for a scholarship program).
312. Id at 142.
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Unfortunately, this system gave rise to two negative phenomena. First,
and the reason for affirmative action programs in the first place, is that
meritocratic programs favor those from elite secondary schools and those
who had access extra tutoring and coaching.313 This phenomenon created a
schism between those who had better access and those who did not.314
Most often those with the least access to advantageous training were
minorities." African-American students who grew up in a world shaped
more by Plessey v. Ferguson3 1 1 than by Brown v. Board of Education317
could not present the objective achievement-based measures necessary to
compete with their "majority" peers.31 The problem had its roots in pre-
Civil Rights Era racism at the K-12 grade level.31 9 Colleges, universities,
and graduate schools, however, quickly assumed the moral and ethical need
to provide equal access at the post-secondary school level.320
Unfortunately, educational improvements toward more equal education
at the K-12 level and the post-secondary level have not achieved the goals
set by Civil Rights Era educational reformers. Justice Ginsburg observed
in Grutter that, as of the beginning of this century, "many minority students
[continue to] encounter markedly inadequate and unequal education
opportunities." 321 In 2006, the average African-American score on the
combined math and verbal portions of the SAT test was 863.322 The mean
score for whites on the combined math and verbal SAT was 1063,
approximately 17% higher.323 Hispanics similarly lagged behind.324
313. See THE COLLEGE BOARD, 2012 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP
PROFILE REPORT 4 (2012), available at http://media.collegeboard.com/
digitalServices/pdf/research/TotalGroup-2012.pdf.
314. See id
315. See Walter R. Allen, Black Students in U.S. Higher Education: Toward
Improved Access, Adjustment, and Achievement, 20 URB. REV. 165, 184-85
(1988).
316. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
317. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
318. See Allen, supra note 315.
319. Id at 185.
320. Id. at 165.
321. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
322. A Large Black-White Scoring Gap Persists on the SATs, J. BLACKS IN
HIGHER EDUC., http://www.jbhe.com/features/53SAT.html (last visited Oct. 31,
2012).
323. Id. The article also states:
Not only are African-American scores on the SAT far below the scores of
whites and Asian Americans, but they also trail the scores of every other
major ethnic group in the United States including students of Puerto-Rican
and Mexican backgrounds. In fact, few people realize that Native American
and Alaska Native students on average score 118 points higher than the
average score of black students. On average, Asian American students score
225 points, or 19%, higher than African-Americans.
Id. at 1.
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Today, Wayne Camara, the College Board's vice president for research and
development, attributed the gaps between black and Hispanic students and
whites and Asians to access to education.325 A study in the Journal of
Blacks in Higher Education attributed sharp differences in family income
as a major factor for these results. 326  Consequently, African-Americans
and other minority groups are unable to compete when applying to colleges
and universities whose admissions processes are largely based on a
meritocratic system.
B. A Constitutional Manner of Achieving Diversity
With regard to race-preference admissions policies, the Court has laid
out, with sufficient clarity, what is and is not acceptable for purposes of
complying with the U.S. Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no state shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." '327 Individuals and
groups bring challenges under the Equal Protection Clause, claiming that
members of a class, of which they are a part, are receiving unequal
treatment from a federal or state law. In evaluating these laws, the Court
will subject them to a level of scrutiny depending on the type of group at
which the laws take aim.
Laws differentiating individuals based on immutable traits such as race
or national origin are subject to elevated judicial scrutiny. 32' Laws that do
not implicate a suspect or quasi-suspect class, are subject to the rational
basis test, the most deferential form of judicial scrutiny.329 Under rational
324. Victor Manuel Ramos, SATs: Hispanics Scoring Better, but Lag in College
Admissions Tests, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 26, 2009, 5:55 AM),
http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/news hispanicaffairs/2009/08/sat-scores-
hispanics-doing-better-but-still-behind-in-college-admission-tests.html.
325. Tamar Lewin, Average Scores Slip on SAT, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, at
A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/education/
15 sat.html.
326. Scoring Gap, supra note 323:
In 2006, 24 percent of all black SAT test takers were from families with
annual incomes below $20,000. Only 4 percent of white test takers were from
families with incomes below $20,000. At the other extreme, 8 percent of all
black test takers were from families with incomes of more than $100,000.
The comparable figure for white test takers was 31 percent.
Id. at 1.
327. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
328. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229-30 (1995)
("[W]henever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her
race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and
spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. ") (emphasis added).
329. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640 n. I (stating that that rational basis
test the "normal test for compliance with the Equal Protection Clause is the
governing standard.").
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basis review, the burden is on the challenger to show that the policy is not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.330 The rational basis
standard of review does not require a court to take into account the actual
purposes behind the legislation.33' Any conceivable purpose would suffice.
Under-inclusiveness or over-inclusiveness are not fatal under rational basis
review.332
A regulation based on race triggers strict scrutiny. Programs that
differentiate based on socioeconomic status, however, may only trigger the
rational basis test. 334  Thus, defining a socioeconomic class-based
admissions program is significantly more likely to pass constitutional
muster than is a race-based admissions policy. Studies support the need for
students from low income or poverty level homes to receive a "plus" in the
admissions decision because these students are less likely to achieve the
same academic success as their more financially fit counterparts.335 Thus, a
school employing a socioeconomic plan could successfully argue that its
use of socioeconomic classifications is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.
Class-based admissions policies would yield diverse classes.336
Admitting students whose family income falls at or below the poverty level
would assure a viewpoint that is not otherwise heard in many elite
330. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). A
group of former and current employees of the New York City Transit Authority
filed a suit challenging the Transit Authority's rule disallowing any employees
from partaking in methadone treatment. The regulation did not fail equal
protection merely because it is over-inclusive. The fact that the reach of the rule
includes persons who did not exhibit the trait the Authority was seeking to
exclude-unemployability due to narcotic use-did not make the regulation
unconstitutional.
331. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). A retired
railroad worker filed suit challenging the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974,
legislation that made the plaintiffs ineligible for certain retirement benefits granted
to other workers, on the ground that the statute made a distinction disallowed by
equal protection. The Court found that once there is any plausible reason, that
explanation is enough to withstand rational basis review. Any conceivable
legislative purpose is sufficient under rational basis.
332. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. People of State of N.Y., 336 U.S. 106
(1949). A national delivery company sought to challenge a New York City traffic
regulation which prohibited advertisements on the side of vehicles, claiming that
the regulation was in violation of equal protection because it did not apply to
delivery vehicles that advertised the delivery service itself. The Court held under-
inclusiveness is not fatal under rational basis.
333. See supra notes 70-71.
334. See supra notes 328-332.
335. See THE COLLEGE BOARD, 2012 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP
PROFILE REPORT 4 (2012), available at http://media.collegeboard.com/
digitalServices/pdf/research/TotalGroup-2012.pdf.
336. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1978).
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classrooms. 3 7 There is a legitimate, even compelling, interest in achieving
diversity in education.338 Class-based admissions policies are race-neutral
alternatives to diversifying student bodies. 339  Socioeconomic-based
policies, rather than race-based policies, would therefore achieve the goal
of diversity in education without necessarily having to pass the strict
scrutiny review.
Despite the seeming logic in switching from race-based admissions
policies to class-based policies, institutions have been reluctant to embrace
the concept. 34 0  Both the UT and Michigan plans provided admissions
officials with the opportunity to consider socioeconomic status as well as
race in their admissions decisions.3 4' Yet, despite a clear directive from a
majority of the bench to only consider race in the narrowest of
circumstances, colleges and universities continue to include it as a factor in
their decision-making process. 342  Retooling admissions decisions to a
class-based policy would provide a different type of diversity, one that
institutions are not yet prepared to embrace. Despite decades of precedent,
colleges, universities, and graduate schools are unwilling to shift from a
race-based policy to a class-based policy. 343  Consequently, race-based
admissions policies following Fisher will continue to meet with equal
protection challenges.
337. Id
338. Id. at 314.
339. Fisher IL 631 F.3d 213, 242 n.156, 243 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
340. The notion of shifting from race-based admissions policies to
socioeconomic-based admissions policies has been advocated for decades. See,
e.g., Richard Fallon, Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43
UCLA L. REv. 1913 (1996) (advocating a shift from race-based preferences to
socioeconomic preferences); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative
Action, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1037 (1996); see also Kevin R. Johnson, The
Importance of Student and Faculty Diversity in Law Schools: One Dean's
Perspective, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1549 (2011) (acknowledging efforts to ensure
socioeconomic diversity). One reason for schools' reluctance is historical in
nature. During the neophyte post-Civil Rights Era in which Bakke was decided,
underrepresentation in colleges and universities was equated with race.
Furthermore, at that time, individuals applying to graduate schools, like the
medical school at the center of the Bakke controversy, had spent their primary and
secondary education in racially segregated schools, which, after the mid-1960s,
were universally recognized as sub-par. See Allen, supra note 318, at 185.
341. See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 228; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 256-57
(2003).
342. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L.
REV. 631, 645 (2011) (providing statistical support for his conclusion that schools
favor admitting law students based on race rather than socioeconomic status,
despite presenting with similar LSAT scores).
343. Id
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C. Why Fisher is Irrelevant
It is a poorly kept secret that admissions offices in today's post-
secondary institutions tailor their decisions to climbing the rankings of U.S.
News & World Report.344 Because US. News places heavy emphasis on
objective scores such as GPAs and standardized tests, institutions work
hard to admit those with the most competitive objective admissions
criteria.3 45 African-American and Hispanic students perform less well on
standardized tests such as the SAT.346 Consequently, opportunity costs of
344. See Elise Amendola, Editorial: Colleges Fail Students When They Game
Rankings, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2012, 12:09 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/story/2012-09-05/college-rankings-US-
news/57614840/1 ("Emory [University] officials misrepresented enrollees' SAT
and ACT scores, and in some years their high school standing, in reports to the
U.S. Education Department and to publications that rank colleges, including U.S.
News & World Report."); Kenneth Anderson, LSAC Study on Law Schools Gaming
Resources for US News Rankings, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 3, 2009, 11:31
AM), http://www.volokh.com/2009/12/03/lsac-study-on-law-school-gaming-
resources-for-us-news-rankings (summarizing an LSAC study regarding law
schools redistributing resources to increase their respective rankings in U.S. News
& World Report and noting the increase in merit scholarships intended to improve
the statistical profile of incoming classes); Elie Mystal, Another Law School
Caught in a Lie, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 12, 2011, 1:40 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2011/09/another-law-school-caught-in-a-lie (citing an
example in which a University of Illinois College of Law administrator reported
inflated grade point averages and LSAT scores); Justin Pope, Colleges May Obsess
Over Rankings, But Students Don't Care, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 5, 2012, 12:50
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/05/colleges-may-obsess-over-
n 1256365.html (explaining the significant role of rankings, such as U.S. News &
World Report, on college administrators, with one college, Baylor University,
offering financial rewards to already admitted students to retake the SAT exam as
a ploy to boost the average score it could report.); Elie Mystal, Villanova Law
'Knowingly Reported' Inaccurate Information to the ABA, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb.
4, 2011, 3:34 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/02/villanova-law-school-
knowingly-reported-inaccurate-information-to-the-aba; see also Perez-Pena &
Slotnick, supra note 307.
345. See, e.g., Lani Gunieier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts:
Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 144-45
(2003) (discussing the emphasis that colleges and universities place on U.S. News
& World Report); Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI
Trumps State Anti-Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (2009)
(citation omitted) ("[C]olleges and universities need high average SAT scores to
place well in the college-rankings systems like U.S. News & World Report's
'America's Best Colleges."').
346. 2012 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS 2012, supra note 21 (reporting the mean
SAT for African-Americans as 428, 428, 417).
Critical Reading Mathematics Writing
African American 428 428 417
Hispanic 448 462 442
White 527 536 515
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rejecting a meritocratic admissions in policies of colleges and universities
in favor of a more viewpoint diverse class-based system are very large.347
Indeed, standardized tests figure largely into the problem. Introduced in
1926, the SAT348 was designed to assess a student's preparedness for
college.349 Institutions combined the SAT score35 ° with a student's GPA to
establish an easy base line for admissions.351 Many admissions offices
settle on a score, below which they are unwilling to consider applicants.352
Institutions, particularly elite institutions, strive for a high mean score for
entering students because it will reflect favorably on their academic
reputation.353
The problem is that the SAT presents a bias against students who come
from poor educational backgrounds. 3 54 One study revealed close to a 400-
Id.
347. Thomas J. Epenshade & Chang Y. Chung, The Opportunity Cost of
Admission Preferences at Elite Universities, 86 Soc. SC. Q. 293, 303 (2005).
348. IDA LAWRENCE, GRETCHEN W. RIGOL, THOMAS VAN ESSEN & CAROL A.
JACKSON, THE COLLEGE BOARD, RESEARCH REPORT No. 2002-7: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE SAT: 1926 2001, 1 (2002).
349. A Brief History of the SA T, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbhlpages/frontline/shows/sats/where/history.htmI (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
350. Note: Many colleges and universities settle on the ACT too. Test Prep:
Choosing the ACT or SAT, PETERSON'S, http://www.petersons.com/college-
search/test-prep-act-sat.aspx (last visited Nov. 1,2012).
351. William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates "Built in
Headwinds ": An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 13, 207-08 (2002).
352. Id. at 135, 170.
353. See, e.g., Perez-Pena & Slotnick, supra note 308 (reporting instances of
manipulation at institutions including lona College, Baylor University, and
Claremont McKenna).
354. See Derrick Bell, Diversity's Distraction, 103 COLUM L. REV. 1622, 1630
31 (2003) (citing studies that demonstrate admissions tests "measure quite
accurately the incomes of the applicants' parents"); William C. Kidder & Jay
Rosner, How the SAT Creates "Built in Headwinds ": An Educational and Legal
Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 13, 156 n.73 (2002)
(observing the SAT demands knowledge of "white upper-middle class social





(C) oarsman:regatta *the correct answer*
(D) referee:tournament
(E) horse:stable
Only 22% of those from low income families chose the proper answer (c) as
opposed to 53% of those from more affluent homes. Critics cite an unfamiliarity
among low income households with words like regatta as the reason for a disparate
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point disparity between students from homes with incomes less than
$20,000 per year and students from homes with incomes of over $200,000
per year."' The reason for this disparity is that like other vestiges of
racism, economic disparity generally falls across racial lines.35 6
During the early days of affirmative action admission policies, the
notion of race as a consideration in the admissions process mattered
because students with low test scores could not compete for seats in an
otherwise meritocratic admissions process.5 The problem was
exacerbated with the introduction of U.S. News & World Report rankings
for colleges, universities, and graduate schools.
US. News & World Report rankings first appeared in the early 1980s
and have since become extremely influential."' The rankings are based on
the average standardized test score of entering students, the mean GPA of
entering students, and five other factors.35 9 All data are submitted to U.S.
News & World Report by institutions interested in participating in the
rankings.36 o And while many colleges and universities abhor the U.S. News
& World Report rankings, 61 they all participate. 362 Institutions see the
rankings as a way to maintain or enhance their academic reputation.
Admitting students with lower SAT scores undermined the ranking
result of the answer. See generally SAT WARS: THE CASE FOR TEST-OPTIONAL
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS (Joseph Soares ed., Teachers College Press 2012)
(highlighting the class bias of the SAT); Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Cost of Good
Intentions: Why the Supreme Court's Decision Upholding Affirmative Action
Admissions Programs is Detrimental to the Cause, 27 PACE L. REV. 15, 23 (2006)
(discussing the above as an example of a culturally biased SAT question).
355. See THE COLLEGE BOARD, 2011 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP
PROFILE REPORT 4 (2011), available at http://professionals.collegeboard.com/
profdownload/cbs2011 total group report.pdf (showing a 398 point differential
between students from homes with incomes less than $20,000 per year and
students from homes with incomes of over $200,000 per year). See also THE
COLLEGE BOARD, 2010 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE
REPORT 4 (2010), available at http://professionals.collegeboard.com/
profdownload/2010-total-group-profile-report-cbs.pdf (showing a 392-point
differential).
356. Bell, supra note 355, at 1631.
357. Allen, supra note 318.
358. U.S. News History, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/usinfo/history.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
359. Robert Morse, Methodology: Undergraduate Criteria and Weights, U.S.




361. Margot E. Young, Making and Breaking Rank: Some Thoughts on Recent
Canadian Law School Surveys, 20 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 311, 327 (2001)
(reporting that "a letter signed by 150 [U.S.] law deans was sent to U.S. News
protesting the survey").
362. Johnson, infra note 366, at 311-12.
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system.363 Despite a the general desire to admit a diverse class, the concern
over falling in the rankings due to a lower mean SAT score for its entering
class arguably fuels continued emphasis on the SAT.364 Institutions have
raised concern over the dilemma of rankings and their effect on admissions
decisions.365
Over the past few decades, law schools seem to have been most vocal
about problem of rankings as they are associated with the LSAT. Dean
Alex Johnson wrote, "U.S. News ranking[s] use[] [the] median score in
evaluating law schools in a way that exacerbates the very small differences
between the median scores of schools,... [t]hus ... forc[ing] law schools
to increase their median LSAT score[s] in order to raise [the] rank[ings],
disproportionally affecting those who score lower on the test.
' 366
School officials do not want to acknowledge the quagmire in which the
admissions process is stuck. Justice Scalia, in his Grutter dissent, however,
was willing to so do.367 Scalia supported Justice Thomas' "central point"
that the Michigan need for race-preference programs was based on
"Michigan's interest in maintaining a prestigious law school whose normal
admissions standards disproportionately exclude blacks and other
363. Robert Morse, Methodology: Undergraduate Criteria and Weights, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 11, 2012, available at
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/2011/09/12/methodology-
undergraduate-ranking-criteria-and-weights-2012.
364. Many institutions have been accused of pandering to U.S. News or, worse,
"fudging numbers" to game the system. See Perez-Pena & Slotnick, supra note
308 (reporting instances of manipulation at institutions including Iona College,
Baylor University, and Claremont McKenna); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law Schools
Fudge Numbers, Disregard Ethics to Increase Their Rankings, THE DAILY BEAST
(June 7, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/17/law-
schools-fudge-numbers-disregard-ethics-to-increase-their-rankinghtml (describing
the perspective of the former interim Dean of St. John's Law School); Debra
Cassens Weiss, US News to Law Deans: Please Don't Fudge Your Numbers, ABA
J, (Mar. 11, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
us news to law deans Please dont fudge your numbers (reporting on U.S.
News & World Report's acknowledgement that schools manipulate statistics).
365. Alex M. Johnson, The Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions:
The Pernicious Effects of Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 309 (2006). Note: 150 schools
signed a petition to abolish rankings.
366. Id at 313-14. Law schools', and indeed all schools', reliance on the
median number has significant impact on admissions decisions, particularly at less
elite academic institutions. The median number is that number above which and
below which half the class is ranked. For those competing in the U.S. News &
World Report process, the number of accepted students with standardized test
scores above their desired median dictates the number of students that the school is
willing to admit with standardized test scores below the desired median. See id at
353.
367. Grutter v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306, 347 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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minorities."38 This observation was that schools make a choice to be elite,
and demonstrates that the problem of pandering to the rankings had made
its way to the highest court.
Large elite academic institutions cannot have it both ways.36 9 These
colleges and universities seek to report a high academic average for those
entering its gates.370 The disproportionate performance between minority
students and non-minority students37 1 yields a student body that is more
homogenous than institutions desire. Thus, to assure viewpoint diversity,
institutions create race-preference policies that allow them to give a "plus"
to those who have not performed in a way that would keep the colleges and
universities' standardized test scores or GPAs at an ideal level for purposes
of reporting to those who rank the school.3 72
368. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. ("The Law
School seeks to improve marginally the education it offers without sacrificing too
much of its exclusivity and elite status"); Id. at 355-56 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
369. Claims challenging policies on Equal Protection grounds have brought
against schools ranked in the upper tiers of U.S. News & World Report. See Best
Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (2012), available at http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/law-rankings (last visited Nov. 1, 2012); National University Rankings,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (2012), available at
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-
universities (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (for example, the University of Michigan at
Ann Arbor ranked twenty-ninth nationally, University of Michigan School of Law
School ranked tenth among U.S. law schools, University of Texas at Austin ranked
forty-sixth among national universities).
370. Perez-Pena & Slotnick, supra note 308.
371. See COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS 2012, supra note 347.
372. See Plessey v. Ferguson through U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, supra notes
316-327. Justice Scalia, during oral arguments for Fisher v. Texas, alluded to this
practice questioning African-American and Hispanic applicants from privileged
backgrounds might deserve a preference. Transcript of Oral Argument at 58-62,
Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536
(2012) (No. 11-345), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral arguments/argument transcripts/ 11 -345.pdf.
A 2010 Pew Research Center study entitled, Minorities and the Recession-
Era College Enrollment Boom, found that "Minority college students are
concentrated at two-year colleges and less-than-two-year institutions in
comparison with their white peers (National Center for Education Statistics,
2010b) [and that] among undergraduates at four-year colleges and universities,
minority undergraduates on average enroll at the less academically selective
institutions compared with white undergraduates. The concentration of minority
students at the less elite institutions provides further support for the proposition
that elite intuitions are not accepting minority students with the same frequency as
those schools with less impressive rankings. See, MINORITY AND THE RECESSION-
ERA COLLEGE ENROLLMENT BOOM 6 (June 2010) available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/757-college-enrollment.pdf (citing
Sigal, Alon and Marta Tienda, "Assessing the "Mismatch" Hypothesis:
Differentials in College Graduation Rates by Institutional Selectivity," SOCIOLOGY
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Institutions interested in the twin goals of assuring a diverse classroom
and achieving a high rank in the US. News & World Report rankings are
incentivized to select minority students with the highest SATs and
undergraduate GPAs (UGPAs). " This practice of "gaming the
rankings"37 tends to yield selection of, say, an African-American student
from an elite private high school, who has shared all of the benefits and
experiences of her non-minority peers, over a student from a low-income
family presenting with a less stellar SAT score and UGPA. "
Consequently, the voice that the former applicant contributes to the
classroom may not be of a view that is much different than that of a
majority of her new classmates."'
Ideally, colleges and universities would disregard U.S. News & World
Report and select students whose attributes, which combine objective test
scores and demonstrated uniqueness, best reflect the institutions' academic
missions. A normative shift away from U.S. News & World Report,
however, would not relieve colleges and universities of constitutional
restraint. State funded post-secondary school admissions programs remain
limited to the doctrinal confines of Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter and what is
likely to follow with Fisher.3" A school interested in considering race in
the admissions decision would still be charged with making individualized
decisions about each applicant.3 "8  The current trend of commoditizing
SATs and UGPAs, however, might fall by the wayside in favor of colleges
and universities assuring a real sense that the diverse voices they choose to
admit are ones that might not otherwise make it to the classroom.
To the extent that viewpoint diversity means assembling a critical mass
representing a variety of viewpoints, 379 race and socioeconomic status
OF EDUCATION, Vol. 78, No. 4 (October 2005).
373. See supra notes 307 309.
374. Perez-Pena & Slotnick, supra note 308.
375. See NAT'L Ass'N NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR COLL. ADMISSION
COUNSELING, 2010 STATE OF COLL. ADMISSIONS 18 (2010), available at
http://www.nacacnet.org/research/PublicationsResources/Marketplace/Documents/
SoCA20IO.pdf. The 2010 report for the National Association for College
Admissions Counseling reports that for 2009, 86.5% of colleges attribute grades in
college-preparation courses as the most important factor in admissions decisions.
57.8% report the SAT or ACT as the most important factor in admissions
decisions.
376. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 372 at 58-60. Justice Alito
raised this very concern during the Fisher oral arguments when he asked whether
African-American and Hispanic Applicants from privileged backgrounds deserve a
preference. Id.
377. See generally supra Parts LB, IC, I.B, and II.C (discussing affirmative
action policy jurisprudence in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke and later
decisions, and the treatment of Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin in the lower courts
and in briefs to the Supreme Court)).
378. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003).
379. See id. at 315-16.
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should remain relevant in the admissions process. A post-secondary school
may consider race as one of several factors in its admissions process so
long as it makes individualized holistic decisions about applicants.380
Unfortunately, it is quite costly for colleges and universities to consider
applicants individually; they must assemble a cadre of admissions officials
available to annually review thousands of applications.38'
To paraphrase Justice Scalia in the Fisher oral arguments, it takes a lot
of people to assure racial diversity.382 But it is the Constitution, and not the
cost, that should limit a school's ability to create viewpoint diversity in its
classrooms. Colleges and universities ideally should undertake the
expensive review necessary to ensure that students with the kind of diverse
voices that a classroom might otherwise lack are offered admission to their
institutions.
The best constitutional route to assure meaningful viewpoint diversity
would be for academic institutions to abolish their meritocratic admissions
policies in favor of a holistic review of each applicant. Doing so, however,
is likely to yield decreased mean GPAs or standardized test scores. Sadly,
it seems that today's post-secondary institutions are not willing to
compromise their academic elite status. For this reason, Fisher is likely to
provide little contribution to affirmative action jurisprudence other than yet
another example of what colleges and universities cannot do when creating
race-preference admissions policies.
CONCLUSION
In the coming months the Supreme Court is likely to issue an opinion of
little consequence. In Fisher v. Texas, the Court will most probably strike
down the UT race-preference admissions plan but will not prohibit the
consideration of race in any admissions process. The Fisher decision,
therefore, will do little more than provide colleges, universities, and
graduate schools with another example of an impermissible admissions
program.
Colleges and universities are likely to ignore any broad message that
Fisher may send to them. The decision to strike down the UT plan, like the
decisions in Grutter and Gratz before it, will not encourage schools to
380. Id. at 337.
381. For example, the University of Michigan received 29,965 applications for
admission for the 2009 2010 academic year. See Joseph Lichterman, 'U'
Officials: This Year's Application Numbers Up, MICH. DAILY, Apr. 11, 2010,
available at http://www.michigandaily.com/content/u-officials-say-number-
applicants-has-increased. In 2010, the University of Texas received 31,000
applications. Bill Powers, Message by President Bill Powers: The Challenge of
Admission to UT, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN (Feb. 26, 2010), available at
http://blogs.utexas.edu/towertalk/2010/02/26/the-challenge-of-admission-to-ut.
382. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 372, at 58.
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rethink the meritocratic admissions plans that themselves create the kind of
racial imbalances that lead to race-based admissions policies. The
paramount desire among a significant number of colleges, universities, and
graduate schools today to rise in the rankings will continue to trump
judicial decisions that encourage schools to retool their admissions policies
in a more holistic way. That desire is the primary reason for the growing
irrelevance of affirmative action jurisprudence.
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